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PUBLIC PROCESS AND OHIO SUPREME COURT
RULEMAKING
JEFFREY A. PAmES* AND CHRISTOPHER C. MANTHEYt
I. INTRODUCTION
W HILE COURT-CREATED RULES, IN TERMS OF THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIETY, are
often as important as judicial decisions or legislative acts, they are rela-
tively unknown to the general public. Further, there is often no public input
prior to their adoption. Rather, court rules are often promulgated with no
opportunity for general public discussion. Judge Jack B. Weinstein recently
called attention to such a lack of "public process" in federal court rulemaking1
and expressed the hope that others will "speak out so that the matter can be
thoroughly debated."2 On the state level this factor is absent from most
rulemaking promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court, and this article will
"speak out" on the need for injecting public process into the exercise of
judicial rulemaking authority by that body.3
Several commentators have written about the role of public process in
court rulemaking. They all agree on its desirability, regardless of whether
court rules are subject to subsequent legislative alteration. However, with the
exception of the comments of Judge Weinstein, who focused upon
rulemaking in the federal courts, there has thus far been little discussion of
what this public process should entail or how it should be implemented. This
is particularly true with respect to state court rulemaking. As a result, there has
been little, if any, recognition that the differing types of state court rulemaking
mechanisms may call for differing types of public process.
It is particularly important to discuss public process in Ohio Supreme
Court rulemaking since that court's rulemaking authority recently has been
expanded. This article will trace the historical development of the high court's
rulemaking authority and will demonstrate the lack of public process in
present Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking. It will also discuss the reasons for
this lack of public process and will suggest the ways of increasing public
access to the court's various rulemaking mechanisms.
* Assistant Professor, University of Akron Law Center. B.A., Colby College; J.D., Univ. of
Chicago.
t Univ. of Akron Law Center, Class of 1980. B.A., Hiram College; M.L.S., Kent State Univ.
' J. WEINSTEIN, REFoRM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 87 (1977). See also Weinstein,
Reform of the Federal Rule-Making Process, 63 A.B.A.J. 47 (1977); Weinstein, Ref orm of Federal
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976). Professor Wright has convinced us
to delete Judge Weinstein's recurring hyphen, Wright, Book Review, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 652,658 n.3
(1978), although we do follow the judge's incorporation of both lawyer and non-lawyer elements
of society into the term "public."
2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 153.
3 In so doing we will take a very broad view of what is encompassed within public process,
perhaps a view not shared by Judge Weinstein. A discussion of the need for public process in
lower court rulemaking is beyond the scope of this article.
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II. PERSPECFIvE ON THE OHIO SUPREME COURT's RULEMAKING AUTHORITIES
In 1968, the voters of Ohio approved the so-called "Modem Courts
Amendment," which effected the first major change since 1851 in article IV of
the Ohio Constitution, the judicial article.4 In part, this amendment expressly
granted the Ohio Supreme Court new and extensive rulemaking authority.
Section 5(A) of the new judicial article stated that the court "shall have general
superintendence over all courts in the state" and authorized the adoption of
rules "to provide for the temporary assignment of judges to sit and hold court
in any court established by law." Section 5(B) said that the court "shall
prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state,"
that it "may make rules to require uniform record keeping for all courts of the
state," and that it "shall make rules governing the admission to the practice of
law and discipline of persons so admitted." Section 5(C), after granting to
high court judges the power "to pass upon the disqualification" of appellate or
common pleas court judges, declared that "rules may be adopted to provide
for the hearing of disqualification matters involving judges of courts
established by law." Section 4(A) provided that the supreme court prescribe
"by rule" the duties and powers of presiding judges of the courts of common
pleas. Furthermore, section 2(B)(1)(g) recognized the court's original
jurisdiction in "admission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so
admitted, and all other matters related to the practice of law." Such a rule may
well be an implicit grant of rulemaking authority.
Before 1968, the supreme court had little, if any, general power of
superintendence over the judicial system in Ohio.5 It did, however, possess
some rulemaking authority over practice and procedure, as well as significant
rulemaking authority over the practice of law. Further, much of this pre-1968
judicial authority was based on statute.7 Thus, the 1968 amendments
constituted a significant alteration in the relationship which had previously
existed between the court and the Ohio General Assembly.8
Milligan & Pohlman, The 1968 Modem Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, 29
OHIo ST. L.J. 811 (1968).
5 Id. at 821-22. But see, e.g., OHo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 1901.14(D) (Page 1968), mandating that
municipal judges include in their yearly reports data required by the supreme court. This
mandate apparently was first implemented at the time of the establishment of municipal courts.
Act of May 24, 1951 § 1, 124 Ohio Laws 589, 601 (1951).
6 Milligan & Pohiman, supra note 4, at 829.
7 At least one commentator finds justification for the legislature's pre-1968 power to enact
procedural laws in two constitutional provisions appearing in the Ohio Constitution since
statehood. These provisions are said to constitute indirect grants of authority. One provision
declared that "every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by the due course of law," while a second stated that the legislative authority was
vested in the Ohio General Assembly. Browne, Civil Rule I and the Principle of Primacy - A
Guide to the Resolution of Conflicts Between Statutes and the Civil Rules, 5 OHIO N.U.L. REV.
363, 397-98 (1978) (citing OHIo CONsT. art. VIII, § 7, art. I, § 7 (1802); Osno CoNST. art. I, § 16,
art. II, § 1 (1851) ). See also Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 143, 285 N.E.2d 736,743, appeal
denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). Article XIV of the Ohio Constitution of 1851 has also been sug-
gested as a source of judicial rulemaking authority. Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 21-22,
231 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1967).
8 See generally Browne, supra note 7, at 396-402. Although the high court has possessed
explicit, constitutionally-based rulemaking authority since 1968, the extent to which the
legislature continues to maintain any independent rulemaking authority appears to be an open
question. Id. at 403-10. The proper legislative-judicial relationship in the context of further
[Vol. 28:249
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The Ohio Supreme Court has possessed at least some rulemaking
authority since the earliest days of statehood. On April 15, 1803, the First
General Assembly passed "an act organizing the judicial courts" of Ohio,
which implemented the judicial article of the first Ohio constitution. 9 At that
time, the supreme court was granted the power to establish rules of practice
for itself and for the courts of common pleas.'0 However, this authority over
the general rules of practice for the common pleas courts was withdrawn the
next year," and the legislature thereafter enacted procedural statutes for both
law and equity proceedings in the lower courts. 2 On February 16, 1810, the
courts of common pleas were given general power to make their own rules of
practice, as long as they were "as near as may be, conformable to the rules of
the supreme court." The supreme court, however, was not given any
enforcement power.'3 Three days later, an additional rulemaking provision
was added which granted to the courts of common pleas the power to
establish rules of practice for proceedings in chancery.14 Such delegations of
rulemaking powers apparently remained relatively unchanged until the
adoption of the civil code in mid-century. 5
proposed changes which deal with constitutionally-recognized court rulemaking continues to be
debated. See, e.g., 49 OHIO B. 1575 (1976); 50 OHIO B. 169 (1977); 50 OHIo B. 293 (1977).
It should be noted that Ohio's lower courts have traditionally possessed certain rulemaking
authority. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 16, 1810 ch. LXXIV, § 40,8 Ohio Laws 259,274-75 (1809) (com-
mon pleas); Act of Feb. 25, 1852 § 6,50 Ohio Laws 84,85 (1852) (probate); Act of April 14, 1884
§ 451(b), 81 Ohio Laws 168, 170 (1884) (circuit). For some lower courts, their powers and thus
their relationships to the legislature were altered in 1968 as well. OHIO CoNsT. art. IV, § 5(B).
9 Act of April 15, 1803 ch. XIV, 1 Ohio Laws 35 (1803) (Laws, etc.); Owo CoNsT. art. II, § 1
(1802), reprinted at I Ohio Laws 10 (1803) (constitution).
10 "[Tihe supreme court shall have power .. .to make and establish all necessary rules for
the orderly conducting [of] business in the said court . .. and to prescribe the forms of writs
throughout the state, and to direct the general rules of practice for the courts of common pleas."
Act of April 15,1803 ch. XIV, § 5,1 Ohio Laws 35,37-38.(1803) (Laws etc.). The Ohio Constitution
of 1802 provided that the state's judicial power be "vested in a supreme court, in courts of
common pleas for each county, in justices of the peace, and in such other courts as the legislature
may, from time to time, establish." OHIO CONsr. art. III, § 1 (1802), reprinted at 1 Ohio Laws 10
(1803) (constitution) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. app. at 336 (Page 1979).
"1 Act of Feb. 18, 1804 ch. XXV, § 16, 2 Ohio Laws 158, 165 (1804).
1I Browne, supra note 7, at 397.
"3 "[lit shall be lawful for either of said courts [the supreme court and the court of
common pleas], from time to time, as occasion may require, to make rules and orders for
their respective courts . . . to regulate the practice of the said courts respec-
tively .. .and in order that the rules of practice and proceedings of the several courts
of common pleas may be uniform, and as near as may be, comformable to the rules of
the supreme court, the judges of the supreme court shall order the clerk of said court, to
transmit copies of their rules and regulations, to the clerks of the courts of common pleas
in every county, that the judges of the said courts may, from time to time, make rules and
regulations agreeably thereto, as near as may be, for the practice of their courts
respectively.
Act of Feb. 16, 1810 ch. LXXIV, § 40, 8 Ohio Laws 259, 274-75 (1809).
14 "[It shall be lawful for either of the said courts [the supreme court or the court of common
pleas], or courts of chancery ... to make, alter, amend or revoke any rule of practice, . . . so
that the same be not contrary to the provisions of this and any act of the legislature." Act of Feb.
19, 1810 ch. LII § 50, 8 Ohio Laws 178, 191 (1810).
'5 The rulemaking provision quoted at note 13 supra was retained during successive reor-
ganizations of the judicial branch. Act of Feb. 23, 1816 ch. LXXVIII, § 72, Ohio Laws 310, 340
(1816); Act of Jan. 22, 1824 § 73, 22 Ohio Laws 50, 66 (1823); Act of March 8, 1831 § 76, 29 Ohio
Laws 58, 72 (1831). The rulemaking provision, quoted at note 14 supra seemingly was repealed
during the 1824 revision of the statute which directed the mode of proceeding in chancery. Act of
1979]
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With the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1853,6 the supreme
court was granted sweeping power to prescribe rules for itself, the district
courts and the courts of common pleas.' 7 At about the same time, the supreme
court was granted the power to make rules which regulated probate court
proceedings.'" While the civil code repealed most of the rulemaking statutes
which were then in existence,' 9 it did not affect the provision authorizing the
supreme court justices to regulate practice before the supreme court.20
The year 1885 brought significant change. The provision which conferred
Jan. 22, 1824, 22 Ohio Laws 75 (1823) (General). This provision was restored in a slightly different
form in a further revision in 1831. Act of March 14,1831 § 3, 29 Ohio Laws 81,81 (1831) (General).
There were other miscellaneous rulemaking or quasi-rulemaking statutes enacted prior to the
adoption of the civil code. For example, in the early days of statehood, the supreme court did not
sit at Columbus but at various county seats of justice throughout the state. Act of April 15,1803 ch.
XIV, § 2, 1 Ohio Laws 35,35-36 (1803). The court was then authorized to determine the times of
holding court in the various counties. Id. As the volume of business grew, the court was autho-
rized to divide the state into two districts, to sit in panels of two, and to decide which members of
the court would sit in which districts. Act of Feb. 17, 1808 ch. XII, §9 1, 2, 6 Ohio Laws 32, 32
(1808). When the judicial branch was reorganized in 1831, a "supreme court in bank" was created
so that annual meetings of all judges of the supreme court were thereafter required. Act of
March 10, 1831 § 1, 29 Ohio Laws 93, 93 (1831) (General). This supreme court en banc was then
granted the power to prescribe its own rules of practice in a statutory provision. This statutory
provision was independent of the provision which granted rulemaking authority to the supreme
court. Compare id. 1 9, at 93-94 with Act of March 8,1831 § 76,29 Ohio Laws 56,72 (1831) (Gen-
eral). Finally, in 1845 the supreme court en banc was given the authority to establish rules to
permit parties to voluntarily admit documents and laws into evidence. Act of March 12,1845 6,
43 Ohio Laws 114,115 (1844). This provision expressly stated that these rules were to be "binding
and obligatory" in all courts of common pleas. Id. It constituted an important shift in legislative
thinking about the supreme court's role in the Ohio judicial system. Apparently for the first time
since 1803 the supreme court was given explicit rulemaking power over the common pleas courts.
" Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, 51 Ohio Laws 57 (1853).
17 The judges of the supreme court shall .. .revise their general rules, and make such
amendments thereto as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this
code; and they shall make such further rules consistent therewith, as they may deem
proper. The rules so made shall apply to the supreme court, the district courts, and the
courts of common pleas.
Id. 1 601, at 160.
18 The several probate judges shall, from time to time, make rules not inconsistent with
the laws of this State, for regulating the practice and conducting the business in their
respective courts ... and the supreme court shall have power to alter and amend all
such rules, and to make other and further rules, from time to time, for regulating the
proceedings in all the probate courts of this State, as they shall judge necessary in order
to introduce and maintain regularity and uniformity in the said proceedings.
The Act Defining the Jurisdiction and Regulating the Practice of Probate Courts § 14, 51 Ohio
Laws 167, 171 (1853).
This power survives today: "The several judges of the probate court shall make rules
regulating the practice and conducting the business of the court, which they shall submit to the
supreme court. In order to maintain regularity and uniformity in the proceedings of all the
probate courts, the supreme court may alter and amend such rules and make other rules." Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2101.04 (Page 1976).
'" Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio § 606, 51 Ohio Laws 57, 162-65 (1853).
'0 "The Supreme Court shall have power to prescribe such rules for the regulation of its
practice ... as may not be inconsistent with the laws of this State." Act of Feb. 19,1852 § 6,50
Ohio Laws 67, 68 (1852). Compare this rulemaking statute with its predecessor, Act of April 15,
1803 ch. XIV, § 5, 1 Ohio Laws 35,37-38 (1803) (Laws, etc.). Although the civil code provided the
supreme court with varying degrees of rulemaking authority, see notes 17, 18 supra, the court
promulgated only one set of rules. By January, 1858, the supreme court pursuant to its newly
acquired rulemaking power, see note 17 supra, adopted both "rules peculiar to the business of the
Supreme Court," Ohio Sup. Ct. R. I, 11, 5 Ohio St. at v (1858), and "rules other than those peculiar
to the business of the supreme court." Ohio Sup. Ct. R. X, XI, 5 Ohio St. at ix (1858). These rules in
large part covered the manner in which cases were to be litigated in the supreme court, together
[Vol. 28:249
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upon the supreme court the rulemaking authority over the lower courts l was
omitted.2 Thus, once again the supreme court was without statutory
rulemaking power over lower courts.2
In 1935 the balance shifted once again in favor of more judicial rulemaking
authority.24 A new provision directed the courts of common pleas and courts
of appeals to make rules governing practice in their respective courts and to
submit them to the supreme court for its approval. The supreme court was
then empowered to amend these rules and to make its own rules, which would
be binding in any of the courts of the state. Thus, the type of rulemaking
power which the supreme court previously had possessed over the probate
courts was extended to other lower courts, and the modem trend toward
recognition of the increased supreme court rulemaking power began. The
language of this 1935 provision was condensed somewhat in 1953 but remains
a part of Ohio statutory law.2
with recordkeeping in the supreme court, district courts, and common pleas courts. Id. These
rules remained relatively unchanged for some time, despite occasional amendments. See, e.g.,
Ohio Sup. Ct. R. VIH, 9 Ohio St. at viii (1874); Ohio Sup. Ct. R. I, H, 15 Ohio St. at v (1866). In
1875, the first rule regarding "applications for admission to practice as attorneys and counselors at
law" appeared. Ohio Sup. Ct. R. XXVI, 24 Ohio St. at v (1875).
21 In 1880, when the laws of Ohio were finally codified into the revised statutes, Act of June 23,
1879,76 Ohio Laws 192 (1879), the provision giving the court power to make its own rules became
section 439, while the provision giving it rulemaking authority over many of the lower courts
became section 446.
2 Act of Feb. 7,1885 § 439,82 Ohio Laws 16,18 (1885). This change coincided with a change in
the lower court structure in Ohio. As amended on October 9,1883, the judicial article of the 1851
constitution provided for circuit courts, and no longer provided for district courts; while both
courts served essentially as intermediate appellate courts, the old district courts were composed
of common pleas and supreme court justices, while circuit courts had their own judges. Compare
the original provision, Omo CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1802) with the current provision, Omo CoNST. art.
IV, 6.
2 Supreme court rules, however, continued to have an impact on lower court procedure. For
example, the judges of the circuit court were empowered to adopt uniform rules of practice for
all the circuits, provided they were not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court. Act of Feb.
7, 1885 § 451, 82 Ohio Laws 16, 21 (1885).
Furthermore, notwithstanding the statutory change in 1885, the rules covering, inter alia,
recordkeeping and continuances in circuit and common pleas courts were promulgated by the
high court in early 1897. See the supreme court rules at 38 Ohio St. at xxxii (1883); 46 Ohio St.
at v (1890); 55 Ohio St. at xix (1897). These rules continued well into the twentieth century. See
the supreme court rules at 82 Ohio St. at lxxiv (1910); 127 Ohio St. at lxxxvii (1934); 157 Ohio St.
at lxx (1952).
The supreme court also retained rulemaking authority over the probate courts. 1 ANN. REV.
STAT. OF OHIO § 536 (Bates 6th ed. 1906). The supreme court appears to have seldom exercised
this authority, however. Perhaps this was in large part due to the adoption by the majority of Ohio
probate courts of the Uniform Rules of Probate Practice. E. H. PoLLAcK, OMo COURT RULSm
ANNOTATED 59 (1949).
24 The supreme court may make and publish rules with respect to the procedure in the
supreme court not inconsistent with the laws of the state. The several judges of the courts
of common pleas and the courts of appeals shall make rules, not inconsistent with the
laws of the state, for regulating the practice and conducting the business of their
respective courts, which they shall submit to the supreme court. The supreme court may
alter and amend such rules and make other and further rules, from time to time as is
deemed necessary for regulating the proceedings in any of the courts of the state, for the
purpose of making this act effective for the convenient administration of justice or of,
otherwise, simplifying judicial procedure.
Act of April 14, 1935 §§ 12223-12247,116 Ohio Laws 104,114 (1935). The resulting rules of prac-
tice of the courts of appeal appear at 50 Ohio App. at xlix (1936).
n The supreme court may make and publish rules with respect to the procedure in the
supreme court not inconsistent with the laws of the state.
The several judges of the courts of common pleas and the courts of appeals shall
1979]
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In 1959 the legislature further extended the court's rulemaking power. It
gave the supreme court the power to prescribe uniform rules of practice and
procedure for traffic cases in courts inferior to the court of common pleas,
provided that these rules were consistent with certain statutory provisions.26
This was the last change in the court's procedural and supervisory rulemaking
authority until the passage of the Modem Courts Amendment in 1968.
Because the foregoing statutory scheme has not been significantly altered
since 1968,27 there currently are at least five statutes which confer procedural
and supervisory rulemaking authority on the supreme court. One statute,
which deals with power over the probate courts,28 can be traced back to
1853.29 A second statute, which grants the court authority to prescribe its own
rules, 30 can be traced in virtually its present form back to 185231 and in only a
slightly different version back to 1810.32 A third statute, which confers broad
make rules, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for regulating the practice and
conducting the business of their respective courts, which they shall submit to the
supreme court. The supreme court may alter and amend such rules and make other rules
necessary for regulating the proceedings in any courts.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.45 (Page 1954).
It is interesting to note that when presented with appellate court rules pursuant to this
provision, the Ohio Supreme Court took the view that Ohio courts of record had the inherent
power to promulgate rules without preliminary high court approval. E. H. PoLLAcK, supra note
23, at 54. See also 8 Omo B. 447 (1935) (letter from Chief Justice Weygandt to Common Pleas
Judge Gilmore, wherein the supreme court's position was based upon the lack of any
constitutional provision). Today, appellate court rules need only be "filed" with the supreme
court. Omo R. App. P. 31.
One small change was made in 1953 when the revised code was adopted. Since the beginning
of statehood, it had been well established in the supreme court's rulemaking statute that court
rules should be consistent with state laws. Thus it was clear that statutes took precedence over
court rules, and the supreme court explicitly recognized this fact. However, in 1953 this language
was dropped from the statutes which covered the supreme court's own rules. Compare Act of
Feb. 19, 1852 § 6, 50 Ohio Laws 67, 68 (1852), quoted at note 20 supra, with OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2503.36 (Page 1954). This language also was dropped from the probate courts' rules. Orno
REv. CODE ANN. § 2101.04 (Page 1976). The implication was that the balance of power was now
reversed and that court rules were now to have precedence over statutes. However, the provision
regarding conformity to state law was retained in another key rulemaking statute, Osno REv.
CODE ANN. § 2505.45 (Page 1954), quoted at this note supra, so that the effect of the change was
probably more illusory than real.
26 One new provision said: "The supreme court of Ohio may ... for the purpose of
promoting prompt and efficient disposition of cases arising under the traffic laws .. .and
related ordinances make uniform rules for practice and procedure in courts inferior to the court
of common pleas .... " Act of July 21, 1959 § 2937.46, 128 Ohio Laws 97, 112 (1959). A second
new provision said: "[T]he supreme court of Ohio may, by rule, provide for the uniform type and
language to be used in any affidavit or complaint to be filed in any court inferior to the court of
common pleas for violations of the motor vehicle and traffic acts and related ordinances .. "
Id. § 2935.17, at 102. Pursuant to these provisions, the high court promulgated Rules of Practice
and Procedure in Traffic cases for All Courts Inferior to Common Pleas (effective by at least
January 1, 1969). Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 23,12 Ohio St. 2d at xxii (1968). These rules for traffic cases may
have been the first set of rules promulgated by the high court for governing courts which were
neither constitutionally mandated nor state-funded.
27 An act was recently passed recognizing supreme court authority in rulemaking over the
court of claims, yet reference was simply made to the Modern Courts Amendment. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2743.03(D) (Page 1954).
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.04 (Page 1976), quoted at note 18 supra.
29 The Act Defining the Jurisdiction and Regulating of Practice of Probate Courts, 51 Ohio
Laws 167 (1853).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.36 (Page 1954).
a" Act of Feb. 19, 1832, 50 Ohio Laws 67, 68 (1852), quoted at note 20 supra.
32 Act of Feb. 16, 1810 ch. LXXIV, 8 Ohio Laws 259, 274 (1809), quoted at note 13 supra.
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rulemaking power over the supreme court and some lower courts, 3
originated in 1935,' 4 but this statute had a precursor in a portion of the first
code of civil procedure which granted the court similar powers.3 5 Finally, two
statutes, which grant the court authority to make rules for traffic cases in the
inferior courts, date back to 1959.36
Rulemaking statutes outside the procedural and supervisory domain have
also survived the 1968 constitutional amendments. Two provisions of Ohio
law now give the supreme court authority over the practice of law. One grants
the court power to prescribe rules governing admission to the bar,37 and the
other gives it concurrent power, along with the courts of appeals and courts of
common pleas, to discipline attorneys.3 8
These functions predate statehood. The government of the Northwest
Territory consisted, in part, of territorial judges. In 1792, the territorial
government passed a law requiring any attorney practicing law in the
Northwest Territory to have his professional abilities examined by one or
more of these judges. 39 By 1799 the territory had acquired a general assembly.
In that year, the general assembly passed a new act regulating in considerable
detail the practice of law.40 This act required attorneys to have a license from
the governor 4' which could only be obtained by passing an examination
before two or more judges of the general court.42 Furthermore, the applicant
would not be admitted to the examination unless he produced a recom-
mendation from a practicing attorney with whom he had studied for
four years. 43 While examinations were to be conducted by at least two of the
judges of the general court, these judges were authorized to appoint qualified
examiners. 44 The act also placed various restrictions on the practice of law;
33 Oimo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.45 (Page 1954), quoted at note 25 supra.
34 Act of April 14, 1935 §§ 12223-12247, 116 Ohio Laws 104 (1935), quoted at note 24 supra.
35 See Act of Feb. 7, 1885 § 439, 82 Ohio Laws 16, 18 (1885); Code of Civil Procedure of the
State of Ohio § 601, 51 Ohio Laws 57, 160 (1853).
16 Act of July 21, 1959 § 2935.17, 128 Ohio Laws 97, 102 (1959); id. § 2937.46, at 112.
3' No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law, or to
commence, conduct, or defend any action or proceeding in which he is not a party
concerned . . . , unless he has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court
in compliance with its prescribed and published rules.
OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.01 (Page 1977).
" The supreme court, court of appeals, or court of common pleas may suspend or
remove an attorney at law from office or may give private or public reprimand to him as
the nature of the offense may warrant, for misconduct or unprofessional conduct in
office involving moral turpitude, or for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude ...
Id. § 4705.02.
" [N)o person shall be admitted or practice as an attorney in any of the courts of this
territory unless he is a person of good moral character and well affected to the
government of the United States and of this territory and shall pass an examination of his
professional abilities before one or more of the territorial judges and obtain from him or
them before whom he may be examined a certificate of possessing the proper abilities
and qualifications to render him useful in the office of an attorney.
2 Laws Passed in the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio § 1, at4O (1792).
40 1 Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio 27-38 (1800).
11 Id. § 1, at 27-28.
42 Id. *2, at 28.
43 Id.
44 Id. § 3, at 29.
1979]
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these restrictions included the prohibition of judges, justices of the peace,
court clerks, and sheriffs from practicing as attorneys in their home counties.45
The 1799 act thus established joint legislative and judicial control over the
practice of law, and this joint control has been characteristic of Ohio's legal
system ever since.
The first state law on admission to the practice of law retained the main
features of the territorial law; however, examinations were now to be
conducted, or at least attended, by "any two judges of the Supreme Court."4
The requirement of a license from the governor was eliminated. 47 Thereafter,
the statutory scheme on examinations remained virtually unchanged
throughout most of the nineteenth century.8 When the revised statutes were
adopted in 1880, the examination requirement became section 558, and a
provision was added thereto which required the court to prescribe aid
publish rules'governing it.49 The language of this section has been carried over
to today,50 as have the territorial law restrictions on the practice of law by
certain judicial and law enforcement officers.51
The 1799 act regulating the practice of law in the Northwest Territory
gave the judges of the general court the power "at their discretion, to strike the
name of any attorney from the roll [of licensed attorneys] for mal-conduct in
his office."5 2 The act provided that before such action could be taken, the
attorney involved must have been served with a written complaint and given
the chance to be heard in his own defense.- After statehood, the state
supreme court could suspend attorneys from practicing in any court in the
state.54 In 1810, however, this power was narrowed so that the supreme court
could suspend attorneys only from practicing before its own bench.55 The
451d. § 7, at 31.
46 Act of Feb. 4, 1804 ch. XX, § 2, 2 Ohio Laws 124, 124 (1803-04).
47 id. § 1, at 124.
48 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 27, 1810 ch. XXVH, §§ 1-3,8 Ohio Laws 83,83-84 (1809); Act of Feb. 14,
1824 §§ 1-3,22 Ohio Laws 374,374 (1823) (General); Act of Feb. 14,1824 §§ 1-3,29 Ohio Laws 411,
411-12 (1831) (General). In 1875 the supreme court did adopt a short rule regarding applications
for admission to practice, but it did not conflict with the statutory scheme. Ohio Sup. Ct. R. XXVI,
24 Ohio St. at v (1875).
49 No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law ....
unless he has been previously admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court, or
of two judges thereof; and the court shall fix times when examinations shall take
place .. .., and shall prescribe and publish rules to govern such examinations ....
1 REv. STAT. OF OHIO § 558 (1879). A detailed court rule soon followed. Ohio Sup. Ct. R. XXVI, 38
Ohio St. at xxx (1883). It was the subject of much change until the time of the 1968 Modern Courts
Amendment. See, e.g., Ohio Sup. Ct R. XV, 46 Ohio St. at xii (1890); Ohio Sup. Ct. R. XIV, 65
Ohio St. at xxx (1902); Ohio Sup. Ct. R. XVII, 176 Ohio St. at 1 (1964).
50 Omo Rxv. CoDE ANN. § 4705.01 (Page 1977), quoted at note 37 supra.
51 See id.; 1Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio § 7, at3l
(1800). But see, e.g., Act of March 21, 1863, 60 Ohio Laws 21 (1863) (prohibiting deputy clerks
from practicing as attorneys); Act of April 18, 1913, 103 Ohio Laws 468,469 (1913) (prohibiting
judges from acting as legal advisors, collectors, solicitors or attorneys for any bank, corporation,
or loan or trust company).
52 1 Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio § 5, at 30 (1800).
5 Id.
54 Act of Feb. 4, 1804 ch. XX, § 4, 2 Ohio Laws 124, 125-26 (1803-04).
m Act of Jan. 27, 1810 ch. XXVH, § 4, 8 Ohio Laws 83, 84 (1809). At this time, the court of
common pleas was given the power to suspend attorneys from practice before the common pleas
bench; yet any such suspension could be appealed to the high court. Id. § 4, at 84-85.
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high court's authority remained narrowed until the 188O's6 when it was again
broadened such that the supreme court was authorized to remove or suspend
any attorney from office. Such suspensions were effective in all courts of the
state. Similar disciplinary powers were also granted to the common pleas and
intermediate appellate courts.57 Except for a 1925 change allowing these
courts to give an attorney a "public or private reprimand,"5' as compared to a
suspension or removal, the courts' statutory disciplinary powers remain
unchanged. 59 A special form of disciplinary power has been added recently.
Since 1964, the supreme court has had the statutory power, exercised through
a commission of judges which it appoints, to discipline judges through
suspension or removal, as well as to force retirement due to disability.60 The
court was expressly granted the power to promulgate rules under which the
commission would hear and determine disciplinary and retirement
petitions.6 ' About a year later, a basis for the removal or suspension of a judge
was articulated as a "violation of such of the canons of judicial ethics as
adopted by the supreme court as would result in a substantial loss of public
respect for the office."6
2
Besides the foregoing statutory provisions on rulemaking, the pre-1968
Act of Feb. 14,1824 § 4,22 Ohio Laws 374,374-75 (1823) (General); Act of Feb. 14,1824 § 4,
29 Ohio Laws 411, 412 (1831) (General).
57 Act of Feb. 7,1865 § 563,82 Ohio Laws 16,26 (1885). Review of lower court suspensions or
removals, however, was available in the supreme court. Id. A later supreme court rule provided
for the forwarding of lower court disbarment and suspension judgments to the high court. Ohio
Sup. Ct. R. 37, 127 Ohio St. at bxxxviii (1934).
5 Act of March 27, 1863 § 1, 111 Ohio Laws 411, 411-12 (1925).
59 Osno REv. CoDE ANN. § 4705.02 (Page 1977). Shortly after the 1925 change, the high court
adopted a rule concerning the rules of professional conduct. Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 28,127 Ohio St. at
lxxxviii (1934). Within this rule, the American Bar Association Canons of Ethics were
commended, and statutory provisions on duties and obligations of attorneys were not
superseded. This rule also provided that the wilful breach of any of the professional conduct rules
by one admitted to practice law in Ohio would be punished by reprimand, suspension, or
disbarment by any court of competent jurisdiction. Id. This rule on professional conduct rules
was in force for quite some time. See, e.g., Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 28,157 Ohio St. at lxxii (1952). Prior to
1957, this rule was chiefly enforced by the eighty-eight common pleas courts, which were
primarily responsible for discipline. Coen, A Look at Lawyer Discipline in Ohio, 7 CAP. U.L. REv.
245, 245-46 (1977).
Upon the recommendation of the Ohio State Bar Association Council of Delegates, 25 Omo B.
689 (1952), the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted in an Ohio
Supreme Court rule in 1952. Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 28,167 Ohio St. at lxxxiv (1958). The court's earlier
rules of professional conduct were not eliminated. Id. By 1957, a breach of these canons, as well as
the earlier rules of professional conduct, was made the subject of initial inquiry and
determination by the newly created Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. Ohio
Sup. Ct. R. 27, 167 Ohio St. at lxxvi (1958). No longer was punishment by any court of competent
jurisdiction mentioned, so presumably initial enforcement was to be the sole responsibility of the
new board. Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 28, 167 Ohio St. at lxxxiv (1958). The board continues to function
today. See Omo R. Gov'r BAR 5,29 Ohio St. 2d at xxix (1972), amended as noted in 54 Ohio St. 2d
at xxxiii (1978). The predecessor to the Rules for Government of the Bar of Ohio is Ohio Sup. Ct.
R. 18, 176 Ohio St. at liii (1964). Today, the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility governs, for there are no separate rules of professional conduct as in the past.
Compare Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 19,24 Ohio St. 2d at xviii (1971) with Ohio Sup. Ct. R. 19,29 Ohio St. 2d
at xlviii (1970). On present disciplinary procedures, see also Coen, this note supra.,
60 OHio REV. CoDE ANN. § 2701.11 (Page Supp. 1978).
61 Id.
6- Id. § 2701.12(A)(1). The high court had, in fact, adopted substantially all of the American
Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics about ten years earlier, 160 Ohio St. at liv (1954), at the
urging of the Ohio State Bar Association. See 25 OHIo B. 790 (1952). Shortly after doing so, the
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judicial authority to promulgate rules was an inherent power possessed to
some degree by all of Ohio's courts. In an often-quoted syllabus, the supreme
court wrote: "Courts of general jurisdiction, whether named in the
Constitution or established pursuant to the provisions thereof, possess all
powers necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise
of their judicial functions and cannot be directed, controlled or impeded
therein by other branches of government."
Of course, courts "established" pursuant to constitutional provisions are
legislatively created; thus, the exercise of inherent power by constitutionally
"established" courts can be legislatively nullified because their source of
power is statutory.6 4 Courts "named" in the constitution often have their
jurisdiction constitutionally defined; thus, the exercise of inherent power by
constitutionally "named" courts might only be nullified by constitutional
amendment.65 Because the Ohio Supreme Court had been named and granted
certain jurisdiction in the Ohio constitutions of 1802 and 1851, many of the
foregoing statutes on supreme court rulemaking would have been insignifi-
cant prior to 1968 if the court had recognized an absolute, or unfettered, 6
inherent power to promulgate rules. Although for some time the court had
recognized that constitutionally named courts possessed some inherent
rulemaking authority, 67 the court never recognized any inherent power to
court adopted a rule which made any violation of these canons a form of misconduct subject to
disciplinary action by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. Ohio Sup. Ct.
R. 27(5), 167 Ohio St. at lxxviii (1958). Violation of these canons continues to be a cause for
discipline. See Omo R. Gov'T BAR 5(5), 29 Ohio St. 2d at xxxii (1972).
63 Zangerle v. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, 70, 46 N.E.2d 865, 865 (1943). Such
powers have been recognized since adoption of the Modem Courts Amendment. State ex rel.
Foster v. Wittenberg, 16 Ohio St. 2d 89, 92, 242 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1968). Yet such powers could
be exercised only when reasonably necessary. See, e.g., State v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126
N.E.2d 57 (1955).
" OHo CONST. art. III, § 1 (1802), quoted at note 10 supra; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1851,
amended 1968). See also current OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 1 (vesting judicial power in "a supreme
court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas . . . and such other courts inferior to the
supreme court as may from time to time be established by law."). While statutorily-created courts
may only have inherent, or implied, authority derived from statute, there is an indication that
limits exist on the breadth of the legislature's power to override this judicial authority. In re
Thomas, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 343, 348, 117 N.E.2d 740, 743 (P. Ct. Hamilton County 1954).
65 The argument is particularly persuasive when the constitution is silent on rulemaking as
was the Ohio Constitution until 1968. But see the discussion at note 7 supra.
66 Paress, Correspondence, Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 1319
(1979). The authors use the term unfettered judicial rulemaking to mean court rules which cannot
be legislatively altered. The term is also referred to as "true" rulemaking, Hall, Judicial Rule-
Making is Alive But Ailing, 55 A.B.A.J. 637 (1969), or "full" or "complete" rulemaking, A.B.A.
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION SECTION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE 73 (5th
ed. 1971) (handbook).
67 In dictum in Schario v. State, 105 Ohio St. 535, 539-40, 138 N.E. 63, 64 (1922), the Ohio
Supreme Court laid the foundation for the later establishment of unfettered, inherent rulemaking
authority for the constitutionally defined court of appeals, as well as for itself. This foundation
has since been cited with approval. United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (D. Md.
1977); State ex rel. Smith v. Barell, 109 Ohio St. 246, 251-52, 142 N.E. 611, 612 (1924); In re
Appropriation by Director of Highways, 120 Ohio App. 273, 277, 201 N.E.2d 889,893 (3d Dist.
1963). However, it has never been built upon. See the authorities cited in note 8 supra, note 68
infra. Notwithstanding a similar constitutional basis, lower courts may possess differing inherent
powers vis-a-vis the legislature than does the high court. See Comment, The Proposed Criminal
Rules of Circuit Court Practice: A Selective Analysis, 49 Miss. L.J. 617 (1978).
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promulgate rules of procedure which were in conflict with statutes.68
However, the court's unfettered rulemaking power had long been recognized
in the area of admission and practice of law.69 In fact, the supreme court
recognized not only its own power in this area, but also that of the
constitutionally created lower courts.70 The court has said that the area is
"exclusively" under judicial control.71 It has declared that statutes in the area
are "not strictly binding on the courts" 72 and that such statutes should be
viewed as only "an aid to and not as a limitation on the power of the judicial
branch." 73 Because of this recognized inherent judicial power over the
practice of law, the remaining rulemaking statutes on admission to practice
and on the discipline of those persons admitted74 are of little significance. 75
III. RECENT EXERCISES OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S
RULEMAKING AUTHORITIES
As we have seen, the 1968 Modem Courts Amendment expressly granted
the supreme court certain rulemaking authority. Since 1968 the court has
exercised its new constitutional rulemaking authority, as well as its preexisting
statutory rulemaking authority, by adopting ten different sets of rules. 76 An
68 The high court in Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17,22,231 N.E.2d 64,67 (1967), found it
unnecessary to consider whether a procedural rule adopted under a common pleas court's
inherent power would be valid in the face of a conflicting statute. But see Cleveland Ry. v.
Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 188 N.E. 1 (1933) (finding a common pleas court rule not authorized
under the inherent rulemaking power solely because the rule conflicted with general law). See
generally The Rule-Making Power of Ohio Courts, 7 OHIO B. 630 (1935) (noting the difference
between those court rules which were invalidated because of a contrary legislative intent inferred
from the legislative silence and those court rules which were invalidated because of contrary
legislative enactments). See also Meyer v. Brinsky, 129 Ohio St. 371, 195 N.E. 702 (1935).
69 In re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 565, 191 N.E.2d 166, 170 (1963); Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167
Ohio St. 325,335,148 N.E.2d 493,498-99 (1958); In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419,422,132 N.E.2d
113, 115 (1956); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 652-56, 89 N.E. 39, 83-85 (1909).
'0 Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 335, 148 N.E.2d 493, 499 (1958).
"' In re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 562, 191 N.E.2d 166, 169 (1963).
72 In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 424, 132 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1956).
7 Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 334, 148 N.E.2d 493, 499 (1958).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4705.01-.02 (Page 1977), quoted at notes 37, 38 supra.
's The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that Ohio Revised Code section 4705.02 is of "no force
and effect." Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St. 2d 263, 266, 348 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1976).
76 The ten sets of rules, and their original places of publication, are: Rules of Court of Claims
of Ohio, 42 Ohio St. 2d at xxv (1975); Rules of Superintendence for Municipal Courts and County
Courts, 40 Ohio St. 2d at xxxvii (1975); Ohio Traffic Rules, 40 Ohio St. 2d at xvii (1975); Ohio Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 34 Ohio St. 2d at xix (1973); Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 30 Ohio St.
2d at xix (1972); Rules of Superintendence, 29 Ohio St. 2d at xlv (1972); Rules for the Government
of the Bar of Ohio, 29 Ohio St. 2d at xix (1972), amended in 54 Ohio St. 2d at xxxiii (1978); Rules of
Appellate Procedure, 26 Ohio App. 2d at xvii (1971); Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 Ohio St.
2d at xvii (1970); Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 20 Ohio St. 2d at xvii (1969).
Further, and in addition to the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility and its Code of Judicial Conduct have been
adopted. See notes 62, 65 supra. Some of these rules are comparable to the pre-1968 court rules,
while others are not. At least one set, the traffic rules, apparently was not adopted under any
authority granted by the Modern Courts Amendment but rather solely pursuant to statutory
authority. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.17 (Page Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.46
(Page 1975); OHIO TRAFFIc R. 1(B). Yet it would appear that if traffic rules are superintending
rules, then the court rulemaking statutes pursuant to which the traffic rules were adopted may be
superseded by OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(a). The rulemaking statutes which the court relied upon to
promulgate rules for traffic cases may be superseded by OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(b) if municipal
or mayor's courts which hear traffic cases are deemed to be courts of the state.
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eleventh set, the Ohio Rules of Evidence, has been proposed but not accepted
by the legislature.77
There appears to have been no standard mechanism which the high court
used in its formulation and adoption of these rules. There were no permanent
rules advisory committees. Rather, different ad hoc committees composed of
lawyers and judges were sometimes appointed to draft proposals for various
sets of rules or rule amendments. These committees were often aided by law
professors who were likewise appointed on an individual project basis.78
When certain rule changes were finally contemplated by the court, proposed
changes were usually published in the Ohio State Bar Association Report with
an invitation to interested persons to submit written comments.79 Public
hearings on proposed amendments were only occasionally held.80
A. Civil Procedure Rulemaking
The first major rules project undertaken pursuant to the Modem Courts
Amendment was the drafting of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. Since
many elements of the process used in formulating these rules have been
utilized in initiating subsequent rule changes, the adoption of the civil rules
should be examined in some detail.
The constitutional revision of the judicial article was approved by the
voters in May, 1968. Within months the supreme court had begun to
implement its rulemaking mandate by appointing a Rules Advisory
Committee."' The committee separated into twelve subcommittees.82 These
subcommittees considered various blocks of rules, using the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as a guide. It was felt that the federal rules were a desirable
model because of the large numbers of cases interpreting and applying
them.as Yet, because of the differences between the Ohio and the federal
court systems, it was not practical to adopt the federal rules verbatim, and the
committee modified many of them.84 Beginning in mid-August, the full
committee met at three week intervals to review the work of the
7 See 50 Onio B. 231 (1977) on the first set of proposed evidence rules. See also Giannelli, The
Proposed Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evidence and Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. REs.
U.L. REv. 16 (1978) on the status of the rules of evidence.
78 Letter from Stanley E. Harper, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law, to Jeffrey A. Parness (July 18, 1978) (on file with the authors).
7o See, e.g., 44 Ono B. 191 (1971) (soliciting comments and suggestions on proposed
amendments to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure).
80 Such hearings were held during the recent change of the Rules for the Government of the
Bar of Ohio on attorney advertising. 50 Omo B. 1250 (1977).
8' Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio. Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHio B. 727, 728 (1970). The
committee, headed by Judge John V. Corrigan, was chosen in cooperation with the Ohio Judicial
Conference. Id. Composed of thirty-eight lawyers and judges and a small staff, the committee
began work during the summer of 1968. Harper, Introduction to Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure: A
Symposium, 39 U. CN. L. REv. 465, 468 (1970).
'2 Corrigan, supra note 81, at 728.
"' Id. at 729. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court also suggested using the federal rules as a guide.
Id. at 728; Harper, supra note 81, at 468-69.
" Harper, supra note 81, at 469 .The committee's staff notes, which consist of only the views of
certain committee staff members, compare the provisions of the new rules with the former Ohio
statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. Civil Rules at iii-iv (Page
1971) (Editor's Preface).
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subcommittees.85 The committee's complete draft of the civil rules was
finished in December, 1968, and submitted to the supreme court late in that
month.86
Article IV, section 5(B) contains a deadline of January 15 for submission of
proposed procedural rules to the General Assembly. Because January 15,
1969, was less than a month from the time the committee's draft was com-
pleted, the court decided to postpone such submission for a year in order to
allow adequate time for it to consider the rules and to allow public comment
thereon.87 Publication of the draft rules in Ohio Bar, together with a request
for comments, began in November, 1968, and was completed by March,
1969.88 At that time the court began a series of weekly, one-day conferences
with the committee staff to review each rule individually.89 At the same time,
while members of the committee appeared before many bar association
meetings to review and discuss the rules,90 subcommittees performed further
review of certain rules. 9' The court made various changes in the proposed
rules. The modified rules, along with an invitation for further public comment
and suggestions, appeared in Ohio Bar in installments beginning with the
October 6, 1969 issue.92 The court completed its review of the rules in No-
vember of that year and submitted the proposed rules to the clerks of both
houses of the Ohio legislature prior to January 15, 1970.93
Even before submission of the rules to the legislature, a joint House and
Senate select committee, consisting of three members from each branch, had
been formed. 94 At the end of October the joint committee began informally
reviewing the rules. It worked along with the Rules Advisory Committee staff,
which acted as liaison between the legislature and the court.95 The joint
committee's meetings were open to the public, and comments from interested
persons were invited.96 Suggestions emanating from the select committee
were relayed to members of the high court by the Rules Advisory Committee
staff.97 After submission of the court rules to the legislature, further
suggestions of both the joint legislative committee and the Rules Advisory
Committee were considered. 8 The court accepted some of the suggestions. 9
The rules of civil procedure were finally promulgated when the legislature
' Harper, supra note 81, at 469.
86 Id.
87 Id.
8 See 41 OHfo B. 1399-1412 (1968); 41 OHIO B. 1525-49 (1968); 42 Ouio B. 89-106 (1969);
42 OHIo B. 223-43 (1969); 42 Ouio B. 339-55 (1969).
" Harper, supra note 81, at 469-70.
O Id. at 470.
"I Corrigan, supra note 81, at 729.
92 See 42 OHfo B. 1201-17 (1969); 42 Otuo B. 1243-58 (1969); 42 OHIO B. 1415-43 (1969); 43 Omo
B. 21-51 (1970). Rules 38-86 thus appeared one day before submission to the legislature. Corrigan,
supra note 81, at 729.
'3 Harper, supra note 81, at 470.
14 42 OHIo B. 1321 (1969).
95 Id.; Corrigan, supra note 81, at 729.
16 42 OHfo B. 1321 (1969).
V Corrigan, supra note 81, at 729.
98 Id.
99 Id.
1979]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
failed to exercise its constitutional veto power, 10 becoming effective on July
1, 1970, about two years after the adoption of the Modem Courts
Amendment. 101
Since 1970 an abbreviated form of this rulemaking mechanism has been
followed with respect to civil rule amendments. The court files proposed
amendments with the clerk of each house of the General Assembly prior to
January 15. At about the same time, the proposals may be published in Ohio
Bar, and suggestions from the public are accepted until May 1.102 If not vetoed
by the legislature, proposed amendments become effective on July 1 and are
then published in their final form in Ohio Bar, if not in the official reports. 103
B. Evidence Rulemaking
The Ohio Supreme Court used essentially the same process in drafting the
Ohio Rules of Evidence as it used with the rules of civil procedure. 10 4 An
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee and staff were appointed by the court in
June, 1975.105 Like the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, this committee was
made up of members of the bench and bar, while the staff consisted primarily
of law professors. 06 Again, the federal rules were used as a model. 10 7 In July,
1975, the same month that the federal evidence rules became effective, the
committee began its work. 0 8 Four subcommittees were formed, each to
handle a group of rules and each headed by a staff member who did the actual
drafting of the proposed rules. 1 9 Subsequent publication of the proposed
evidence rules, however, was not as extensive as that of the civil rules. Rather
than publish rules in progressive installments, as had been done with the civil
rules, the committee submitted the completed draft to the supreme court
in March, 1976.110 The court reviewed the rules, and only thereafter were the
slightly modified rules widely published along with a request for com-
ments."' The court held hearings on the proposed rules in November, 1976.
The final draft was judicially approved on December 2, 1976, and the rules of
evidence were formally submitted to the legislature on January 12, 1977.112
100 OmUo CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) provides, in part, that "[s]uch rules shall take effect on the
following first day of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval."
'0 Harper, supra note 81, at 470.
'02 See, e.g., 44 01o B. 191 (1971).
o See 44 Osio B. 891 (1971); 29 Ohio St. 2d at lix (1972).
104 Between the drafting of the civil rules and the rules of evidence, various other sets of rules
had been proposed and adopted. See the rules listed at note 76 supra.
'05 O'Neill, Symposium: The Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 515 (1977).
106 Id.
107 Miller, The Game Plan: Drafting the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 549,553
(1977). The late Chief Justice O'Neill advised the committee to use the federal rules as its
foundation. Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 552-53.
'1 Blackmore, The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Years of Heritage and Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L.
REV. 553, 540 (1977). Submission of the committee's work product was accompanied by oral
commentary by staff members. Miller, supra note 107, at 554.
"I The rules were published in July, 1976. O'Neill, supra note 105, at 516; 49 Otuo B. 929
(1976).
"I Blackmore, supra note 110, at 540.
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The final version of the proposed rules was published in February, 1977.113
As was done with the civil procedure rules, the legislature formed a six-
member joint subcommittee to study the evidence rules, composed of
members of the judiciary committees of both houses."4 The subcommittee's
hearings were again public; participation, however, was minimal.'15 While the
rulemaking mechanism for the rules of evidence had been quite similar to
that for the rules of civil procedure, their fate was quite different. The joint
subcommittee voted unanimously to reject the rules of evidence," 6 and the
General Assembly followed its advice.' 7 This rejection resulted partially
from a feeling that there was not enough time for adequate consideration
before the July 1 effective date prescribed by the constitution"' and from the
fact that there were no advisory committee notes, as there had been for the
civil rules." 9 In 1978, the legislature again disapproved of the court's evidence
rules.
120
C. Other Rulemaking
Normally, formulation of major rules packages begins with the drafting of
rules by advisory committees; these rules and an invitation to comment are
published in Ohio Bar.121 The court, in preparing for minor rule changes, has
often departed from this method. Further, there have been differences in the
mechanisms used in drafting proposed rules. These differences are dependent
upon whether they are authorized by section 5(A) or 5(B) of the constitution
or by statute. Finally, there have been important variations between rules
adopted pursuant to the same authority.
The most important difference between rules of superintendence under
section 5(A)(1) and the rules of practice and procedure under section 5(B) is
that the rules of practice and procedure must be submitted to, and approved
by, the legislature.2 Accordingly, the two sets of rules adopted under section
5(A) (1) - the Rules of Superintendence and the Rules of Superintendence for
Municipal Courts and County Courts - were effective immediately upon
113 50 OHIO B. 231 (1977).
114 Walinski & Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against, 28 CASE
W. REs. U.L. REv. 344, 348 & n.21 (1978).
115 Id.
I' id. at 348.
117 Id. at 348-49. This action did not constitute the first legislative rejection of proposed rules;
the criminal rules were vetoed several years earlier. 45 OHIO B. 1183 (1971); 45 OHI B. 407 (1972);
46 OHIO B. 817 (1973). Criminal rules, however, did become effective in 1973. OHIo R. Cm. P. 59,
34 Ohio St. 2d at xciii (1973).
I's Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 114, at 349.
119 Id. at 350.
120 Giannelli, supra note 77, at 18-20. The main reasons for the most recent disapproval include
the following concerns: "(1) that the formulation of the rules of evidence is a legislative, rather
than a judicial, function; (2) that the promulgation of rules of evidence does not come within the
supreme court's authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure . . . ; (3) that the need
for rules of evidence had not been demonstrated; and (4) that certain rules . . . were
undesirable." Id. at 20.
"I' Letter from Stanley E. Harper, supra note 78; Letter from David S. Hay, Staff Advisor on
Procedural Rules, Ohio Supreme Court, to Jeffrey A. Parness (June 7, 1978) (on file with the
authors).
'2 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). However, section 5(B) does not require legislative approval of
rules of admission and discipline,
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adoption by the court.123 Another difference between the sections is that sets
of rules authorized by the practice and procedure part of section 5(B),
including civil rules and evidence rules, have usually been'drafted by ad hoc
advisory committees, while the two sets of rules adopted pursuant to section
5(A) have been drafted by the court's administrative staff. For example, the
comments to the municipal and county court rules were written by the court's
staff rather than by the staff of an advisory committee.' 4 Moreover, when
proposed amendments to these lower court rules recently appeared, it was
requested that comments be sent to the court's Administrative Directorlu
rather than to an advisory committee.
In addition to using advisory committees and court staff, another variation
finds the supreme court adopting, subject to possible revision, rules proposed
by outside groups. Some of the rules of superintendence present examples; at
least two rules were first proposed by the Ohio State Bar Association, while at
least one other originated with the Ohio State Bar Association Foundation.'2
Another example is the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the
court at the urging of the Ohio State Bar Association after initial adoption by
the American Bar Association. 27
There have been significant differences in the notices and comments which
the court has allowed before adopting the various rules; these differences
123 Rules of Superintendence Supreme Court of Ohio, 44 OHno B. 1289 (1971) (applicable to
courts of common pleas, SUPERINTENDENCE R. 1); Rules of Superintendence for Municipal Courts
and County Courts, 48 Omo B. 1 (1975).
124 See 8 Omo REV. CODE ANN. 5 (Baldwin 1971) (Preface to the Rules of Superintendence for
Municipal Courts and County Courts).
125 51 Omo B. 815 (1978). The Administrative Director is also designated recipient of com-
ments on certain standards for lawyer discipline which the high court has recently requested.
52 OHIo B. 1056 (1979).
12 44 Omo B. 1289, 1306-08 (1971). On the adoption of some of these proposals, see 49 Oluo
B. 103 (1973); 46 Onio B. 978 (1973).
127 43 OHio B. 1083 (1970). A more recent, similar example concerns the rule on attorney
advertising. Both bar associations acted quickly after the United States Supreme Court made its
major pronouncement on attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977). While in Ohio the bar association's Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct
had been studying the advertising issue for some time, after Bates the committee undertook a
study of the decision in July, 1977, "for the purpose of making recommendations to the Ohio
Supreme Court." 50 Osno B. 851,869 (1977). Around that time, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted
the bar association's offer of assistance after Bates. 50 Oio B. 870 (1977). Following the American
Bar Association's formal adoption of one of two proposals on attorney advertising in August,
1977, 50 OHuo B. 1033-35 (1977), the Ohio State Bar Association recommended changes in the
advertising rule to the Ohio Supreme Court. 50 OHio B. 1209 (1977). On October 3,1977, a notice
of a supreme court public hearing on this proposed advertising rule appeared..50 OHo B. 1208
(1977). The notice included the October 24th date of the hearing, together with time and place;
the notice also included the bar association's invitation to members to submit comments on the
proposal to the president of the bar association. On October 10, 1977, this same notice appeared,
but added thereto was a request that anyone wanting to speak on the proposal contact the
supreme court clerk. 50 OHio B. 1250 (1977). Nothing else on the proposal appeared in Ohio Bar
until November 28, 1977, when the amendments to the court rules relating to attorney advertising
appeared. 50 OHio B. 1471 (1977). Some newspapers in Ohio ran stories on thehearing, and ten to
twelve responses on the proposal were received by the clerk of court. See Letter from Thomas L.
Startzman, Clerk of Ohio Supreme Court to Jeffrey A. Parness (July 6,1978) (on file with authors).
Apparently, one response was from a layman, "a representative of the Ohio Association of
Broadcasters." Id. This example is a particularly apt illustration of the absence of public process
in Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking when the need for public process seems quite compelling.
A similar illustration regarding attorney specialization seems to be developing. See 52 OHIO B.
479 (1979).
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appear somewhat unrelated to either the type of rule involved or the authority
utilized. Thus, the rules of superintendence, adopted under section 5(A) (1),
were not published in Ohio Bar for the first time until almost a month
after they were effective, and no comments were invited preceding
publication; the same practice has been followed for amendments to these
rules. 2 8 Proposed new additional rules of, superintendence have been
published prior to adoption. 29 In contrast, the municipal and county court
rules, also authorized by section 5(A)(1), were published, with a request for
comments, fully one and a half years before their proposed effective date,' 3
and amendments have likewise been published in advance.13 ' Similar
variations are found among section 5(B) practice and procedure rules. The
original rules of civil' 32 and criminal procedure' 33 were published, with
request for comment, well in advance of submission to the legislature. The
rules of juvenile procedure were also published prior to submission, but by
only three weeks.134 The rules of appellate procedure were not published until
after submission; yet within their publication there was an invitation to
comment.'," Proposed changes to all these rules are not always published
prior to submission to the General Assembly, but even with post-submission
publication, the court invites public comment and suggestions. 3 6 Finally, the
traffic rules, which were promulgated pursuant to statute,137 present yet
another variation. They were first published well before their effective date,
but without a request for comments. 138 Amendments to the traffic rules have
been published as they become effective, with no advance notice.139 It is thus
apparent that there is no consistent supreme court policy regarding notice and
comment during the adoption of rules.
The traffic rules are noteworthy not only because of their statutory basis,
but also because they are the only rules which have a standing committee
charged with their ongoing review. The supreme court created a Review
1' 44 OHIo B. 1289 (1971); see, e.g., 46 Omo B. 103 (1973).
'2 See note 121 supra.
130 47 Omo B. 685 (1973).
131 51 OHIo B. 815 (1978). Comments and suggestions on these more recent changes were to be
sent to the Office of the Administrative Director. Id. Similar notes on the originally proposed rules
were to be sent to the chief justice. 47 Omo B. 685 (1973).
'a 41 Omo B. 1399 (1968).
,3 44 OHIo B. 1183 (1971). Upon resubmission, however, there was no advance notice. See 45
OHIO B. 407 (1972); 46 mo B. 199 (1973); 46 Otno B. 817 (1973).
1- 44 Omo B. 1589 (1971).
135 44 Oto B. 281 (1971). After judicial submission of proposed rules to the legislative body
prior to January 15, comments were to be sent to the court's advisory committee. Id. After such
submission, and not later than 60 days prior to the rules' effective date, the high court is permitted
to amend the rules already submitted. Id. Thus, proposed rules initially submitted by the high
court may be amended, and often are, by the court during legislative deliberations on the pro-
posed rules. See, e.g., 46 Omo B. 199 (1973); 46 Omo B. 817 (1973) (proposed rules of criminal
procedure); see aLso 48 Oo B. 243 (1975); 48 Omo B. 815 (1975) (proposed rules of court of
claims).
'3 See, e.g., 45 Oio B. 301 (1972);45 Omo B. 307 (1972); 46 Omo B. 167 (1973); 46 Omo B. 918(1973). Again, the court contemplated post-submission dialogue with the legislature. See note 137
supra.
" Ohio Traffic Rules, 40 Ohio St. 2d at xvii (1975).
'3 47 Omo B. 885 (1974).
,39 47 Oto B. 1499 (1974).
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Commission, the function of which has been to meet at least once a year to
consider "[a]ll comments and suggestions concerning the application,
administration and amendment" of the traffic rules and to submit its
recommendations to the supreme court. 40 The commission has between five
and eleven members, all of whom serve for three-year terms and at least some
of whom must be chosen from among the ranks of specified judicial and
police officers.141 The commission was established in 1967 when the original
Ohio Rules of Practice and Procedure in Traffic Cases for all Courts Inferior to
Common Pleas were adopted'1 2 and was hailed as a pioneering institution at
that time.14 3
In practice, there appears to be no formal procedure for selecting the
commission's membership. While interested persons are free to express their
interest in serving on the commission, there is no formal application
method. 44 In practice, the Review Commission works very closely with the
court's Administrative Director. 45 The chairman of the commission is
required to consult with the Administrative Director before holding
meetings,' 4 1 and the Assistant Administrative Director serves as secretary to
the commission. 147 While all suggestions for changes in the rules must be
submitted to the commission, the actual drafting of proposed rules is done by
the Administrative Director's staff, which also writes the staff notes that
accompany rules adopted by the court. 48 The commission's meetings are not
closed, but neither are they publicized. 149 Thus, the Review Commission of
the traffic rules functions more as a clearinghouse for outside proposals than as
an originator and drafter of rules. 150 While the commission resembles the
committees which drafted the various other sets of rules, it is somewhat
unique in Ohio.
Four other bodies, all created by court rule, also have some resemblance to
standing committees on rules; they are the Board of Bar Examiners, the Board
of Commissioners on Character and Fitness, the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline, and the Board of Commissioners on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law. All four boards have some rulemaking
authority, which is subject to supreme court approval..
140 OIo TRAmc R. 22(A), 22(C).
141 Omo TRAFFic R. 22(B).
142 40 OHIo B. 1502 (1967). The portion of the original rules which created the commission was
traffic rule 22. The present numbering system and name "Traffic Rules" were adopted in 1975.
OHIO TRAFFIc R. 22, 40 Ohio St. 2d at xvii (1975).
'4 France, The Ohio Supreme Court's Traffic Court Rules: A Beginning of Procedural Rule-
Making, 1 AKRON L. Rxv. 1, 25 (1968).
144 Telephone conversation between Jeffrey A. Pamess and Coit H. Gilbert, Administrative
Director, Ohio Supreme Court, on April 18, 1979, in response to a letter from Jeffrey A. Parness to
Coit H. Gilbert (April 13, 1979) (on file with authors).
14 The office of Administrative Director is created by the Ohio Constitution, which broadly
defines the duties of that office. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(2) states: "'The supreme court shall
appoint an administrative director who shall . . .serve at the pleasure of the court."
146 OHo TnAmc R. 22(C).
147 Conversation with Coit H. Gilbert, supra note 144.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 The original traffic rules were not drafted by the commission. Rather, the commission
replaced the group which devised the first set of traffic rules. France, supra note 143, at 25.
[Vol. 28:249
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss2/4
PUBLIC PROCESS AND RULEMAKING
The Board of Bar Examiners is charged with administration of the bar
examination; it may "promulgate additional rules to aid in the conduct of the
examinations."'' The Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness is
responsible for handling applications for admission to the bar; it is authorized
to promulgate standards of conduct for applicants for admission to the bar.15 2
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has the duty and
authority to adopt necessary rules and regulations for the disciplining of those
already admitted to the bar.'' Finally, complaints regarding the unautho-
rized practice of law are within the domain of the Board of Commissioners
on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. This board has rulemaking authority
similar to that of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.'m
Like the Traffic Rules Review Commission, then, these boards are perhaps
rulemakers, but they do not serve as traditional standing committees on rules.
These boards are not concerned with rules per se but rather are administrative
bodies, the rulemaking activities of which are limited to issuing regulations
necessary to implement their tasks. Yet they are permanent bodies charged
with the continuing oversight of various subjects contained in the Rules for the
Government of the Bar. In some respects they are like rule committees.
IV. POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE OMO SUPREME COURT's RuLEMAING
AUTHORTY
As noted earlier, a further possible source of constitutional rulemaking
authority is Article-IV, section 2(B)(1)(g), which gives the supreme court
original jurisdiction in "all . . . matters relating to the practice of law."'5
Whether this provision actually is read to confer rulemaking authority is
unclear, as is the scope of any such authority.
One case does suggest that at least some of the provisions in the Rules for
the Government of the Bar were adopted as necessary to the implementation
of the grant of jurisdiction in section 2(B)(1) (g). In In re Spott,158 the supreme
court rejected a law student's challenge to certain portions of the character
questionnaire which accompanied his application for registration as a law
student.15 7 The court stated:
Under the provisions of Section 2(B)(1)(g) of Article IV of the
Ohio Constitution, this court has original jurisdiction in the matter of
'5' OHIO R. Gov'T BAR I § 5.
152 OHio R. Gov'T BAR I 9.
153 OHIO R. GOv'T BAR V(37).
'1 OHio R. Gov'T BAR VIII § 16. It is difficult to locate the rules or even the membership of any
of these four bodies. In other states, similar bodies appear to be more accessible. For example,
boards on continuing legal education, created pursuant to court rules, often have their regulations
published in the state bar journal after supreme court adoption. Fulford, Mandatory CLE Comes
to Colorado: The New Rule 260, 8 CoLO. LAW. 619 (1979). The regulations proposed by these
boards are sometimes subject to public hearings. In re Regulations Governing CLE, 52 Wis. B.
BULL. 51 (1979).
115 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g).
's 34 Ohio St. 2d 241, 298 N.E.2d 148 (1973).
157 OHIo R. GOV'T BAR I § 2(A) states, in part: "Every person who intends to take the Ohio bar
examination shall file . . . within 120 days after entering law school, an application for
registration as a candidate for admission to the practice of law . . . . The application shall be
accompanied by . . . a character questionnaire in duplicate prescribed and furnished by the
Court."
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admission of applicants to the practice of law in this state. To assist in
assuring that only those applicants of high standards and moral
character are admitted to practice, the court requires each applicant
to complete the character questionnaire. 58
On the other hand, the court in Smith v. Kates 59 suggested that the authority
for the Rules for the Government of the Bar regarding disciplinary proce-
dures, as opposed to admission procedures, comes from the portion in sec-
tion 5(B) mandating that the supreme court prescribe rules governing practice
and procedure in all courts of the state.160 The court in Smith does mention as
sources of authority section 2(B)(1)(g) and the inherent power cases which
predated the Modem Courts Amendments.161
Thus, while case law is unclear on the source of authority for the
promulgation of Rules for the Government of the Bar, the adoption of certain
provisions within those rules indicates that the court may have relied on
section 2(B)(1)(g).
Formerly, actions involving alleged acts of unauthorized practice of law
by lay people were often brought pursuant to a statutory prohibition because
it was felt that the high court had no disciplinary power over lay people.
16 2
There was a change with the advent of bar government rule VIII, adopted in
1976,163 which established a comprehensive system for dealing with the
unauthorized practice of law by lawyers and non-lawyers alike.164 Because it
has been held that bar government rule V supersedes the former statutory
procedure for disciplining attomeys,1' 5 it is reasonable to conclude that bar
government rule VmI is now the exclusive procedure for handling
proceedings which involve the unauthorized practice of law. Bar government
rule VIII does not seem to be a constitutionally permitted rule of
superintendence under section 5 (A) (1); nor does it seem to fall within the
portion of section 5(B) which authorizes "rules governing the admission to the
practice of law and discipline of persons so admitted." Therefore, unless one
158 34 Ohio St. 2d at 243, 298 N.E.2d at 149.
159 46 Ohio St. 2d 263, 348 N.E.2d 320 (1976).
160 Id. at 265-66, 348 N.E.2d at 322.
161 Id.
162 Omno REV. CoDE ANN. § 4705.01 (Page 1977) makes it unlawful for anyone to practice law
"unless he has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance with its
prescribed and published rules." In Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield, Inc., 52 Ohio
Misc. 105, 113, 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1975), the court held that a local
bar association could seek to enjoin activities involving "not only attorneys at law but corpora-
tions and laymen who are not amenable to the discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio." How-
ever, actions were also brought pursuant to the inherent authority of courts to regulate the prac-
tice of law. In re Practice of Law, 175 Ohio St. 149,151,192 N.E.2d 54,56 (1963), cert denied, 376
U.S. 970 (1964) (finding an inherent power to "regulate, control and define the practice of law"
within the constitutional provision vesting the judicial power, in part, in the supreme court). See
also Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 4 Ohio St. 2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965). In Bar Ass'n of
Greater Cleveland v. Brunson, 37 Ohio Misc. 61,304 N.E.2d250 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1973), in
which the court enjoined a lay person from the unlawful practice of law, the court referred to
both the statutory prohibition and its own inherent power.
'6 Orno R. GovT BAn VIR, 44 Ohio St. 2d at xxxiii (1976).
14 Omno R. GOV'T BAR VI § 2(A) defines unauthorized practice as "the rendering of legal
services for others by anyone not registered under Rule VII ...."
'm Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St. 2d 263, 348 N.E.2d 320 (1976).
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follows the suggestions in Smith v. Kates'66 that the bar government rules are
section 5(B) rules of practice and procedure, the authority for a rule which
purports to regulate laymen might only be justified under section 2(B) (1) (g),
which gives the court original jurisdiction over "all other matters relating to
the practice of law."'16 7
Another area where the supreme court has exercised rulemaking authority
over non-lawyers is, surprisingly, in its regulation of judges. The 'compliance
clause' of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that all judicial officers, whether
or not lawyers, should comply with at least some parts of the Code. 68 Because
judges of mayor's courts in Ohio are not required to be admitted to the
practice of law, 169 parts of the Code of Judicial Conduct also would seem to
be based on the "all other matters" clause of section 2(B)(1)(g). °70
Such a construction of this constitutional clause would not be unique. The
Florida constitution contains a provision quite similar to Ohio's section
2(B)(1)(g). It states that "[t]he supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of
persons admitted."'' Even though this clause does not mention rulemaking,
the Florida Supreme Court has used it as authority to adopt rules similar to
Ohio's bar government rules, Code of Professional Responsibility, and Code
of Judicial Conduct. l72
V. PUBLIC PRocEss AND THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S RULEMAKING AUTHoRIrIES
The foregoing, brief review of Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking reveals
that various mechanisms have been used. While some rule changes were
initially drafted by diverse panels of experts, with input permitted from all
sectors of the public prior to court adoption, others were formulated in
relative obscurity by smaller groups. Legislative participation in the
mechanisms also varies; the legislature plays a minor role, if any, in the
mechanisms used for rules adopted under section 5(A), while it has power to
amend, or even reject, some rules adopted under section 5(B). Presently, most
proposed rule changes are published only in Ohio Bar. As a result of the
166 Id.
167 There is, of course, the argument that regulation of the unauthorized practice of law can be
based on OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1, which vests the judicial power in the high court. In re Practice
of Law, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 54 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 970 (1964). This argument is
unpersuasive, particularly in view of the rather extensive attention given elsewhere in the
constitution to judicial rulemaking power. Yet, we recognize that this attention also undercuts our
section 2(B)(1)(g) analysis.
168 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr, 36 Ohio St. 2d at xxxiv (1973). See also OIo TRAFFIC R. 16
(providing that certain portions of the judicial code shall apply to mayors who sit as judges).
169 The statute authorizing mayor's courts does not contain any requirement that the judges of
these courts be admitted to practice. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1905.01 (Page Supp. 1978). But see
id. H 1901.06, 1907.051 (specifically providing that judges of the municipal and county courts
shall be admitted to the practice of law).
170 Although some portions of the bar government rules, particularly rules V(5)(a) and
VI(1)(c), also apply to non-lawyer judges, one supreme court judge opined that they do not.
State ex rel. Brockman v. Proctor, 35 Ohio St. 2d 79,91,298 N.E.2d 532, 541 (1973) (Corrigan, J.,
dissenting).
171 FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
172 Letter from Hon. Arthur J. England, Jr., Chief Justice, Florida Supreme Court, to Jeffrey
A. Parness (March 12, 1979) (on file with authors).
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variations in the high court's rulemaking mechanisms and the lack of public
familiarity with them, most Ohio rulemaking is inaccessible to the public. This
lack of access, and the consequent absence of public process from judicial
rulemaking, is regrettable.
It is instructive to examine public process in judicial rulemaking in other
jurisdictions. Although such public process only recently has been the subject
of substantial interest 173 to parties within 174 and without 175 government, there
has been substantial agreement on the desirability of public process.
Notwithstanding this general consensus, however, detailed inquiries into the
appropriate elements of public process rulemaking, as well as the
implementation of such public process, have not been widespread.176
Consequently there have been few examinations of the differing forms of
public process called for by the differing types of rules and rulemaking
73 Customary discussions about court rulemaking essentially center on the relative merits of
unfettered versus fettered judicial rulemaking. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 82-84. Compare
draft of MODEL JUDICIARY ATnct § 15, J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 132, 139 (1920) ("The Judicial Coun-
cil . . . shall have exclusive power to make, alter, and amend all rules relating to pleading, prac-
tice and procedure .. ") with draft of MODEL JUDICIARY ARTICLE § 607 and comment thereon, 26
J. AM. J. Soc'Y 51,58 (1942) ("The judicial council ... shall have power to make or alter the rules
relating to pleading, practice and procedure .... The legislature may repeal, alter or supple-
ment any rule or procedure .. ") and text of the MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 9,47 J. AM.
J. Soc'Y 8, 12 (1963) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe rules governing ...
rules of practice and procedure .. "). Compare also Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judi-
ciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL L. REV. 276 (1928) with Kaplan & Green, The
Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rulemaking: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv.
L. REV. 234,254 (1951) ("[It seems doubtful wisdom for a court to place itself beyond legislative
control when it pronounces general rules."). These discussions about fettered versus unfettered
judicial rulemaking continue today. Compare J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 77-87 with Parness,
supra note 66, at 1319-21.
174 See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 105-15; Carter, Federal Civil Justice System, 15
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DocuMENTs 342,345 (1979) (in which President Carter proposes
to promote "more effective means of rulemaking" by requiring "each court of appeals to appoint
an advisory committee composed of persons outside the court to make recommendations on the
rules of practice and operating procedure within that court."); Joiner, Rules and Rulemaking, 79
F.R.D. 471,477 (1978) (discussing "a great need to be more open in the process of rulemaking");
MacKenzie, Dark Doings Among the Judges, SATURDAY REv. May 28, 1977, at 19 (quoting former
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., as saying: "I believe that when judges act as policy makers, and
lobbyists, it follows that their discussions should be public.").
175 See, e.g., C. GRAu, JUDIcIAL RULEMAKING: ADMINISTRATION, AccEss, AND AccouNTAIrrY
49-66 (1978); Ashman, Measuring the Judicial Rule-Making Power, 59 JUDICATURE 215,221 (1975);
Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Lawyer Advertising: Some Practical,
Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 OKLA. L. R y. 509,523 (1978); Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making
Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A.J. 579 (1975); Wheeler, Broadening Participation
in the Courts Through Rulemaking and Administration, 62 JUDICATURE 281(1979).
176 The inquiries which have been made demonstrate a general consensus that permanent,
published rulemaking procedures are needed and that these procedures should include
provisions for the publication of proposed rules, comment periods, open hearings, establishment
of permanent standing advisory committees, and opportunity for widespread input by all
segments of the legal profession and by the public. C. GRAu, supra note 175, at 52; J. WEINSTrIN,
supra note 1, at 147-53; Lesnick, supra note 175, at 579. Yet, these inquiries often do not detail the
significance, if any, which the type of rule, or the traditional judicial-legislative relationship in the
rulemaking area, should play in the implementation of these ideas. Further, the rulemaking
mechanism of any one high court is often made to seem applicable to wide varieties of rules
regardless of the nature of the rulemaking authority. See, e.g., C. GRAu, supra note 175, at 58,
where, in a single table on state rulemaking procedures, the author lists Ohio as having prior
publication, comment period, open hearings, and supreme court committees.
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authorizations. 77 Such examinations are necessary if we seek to infuse more
public process into Ohio judicial rulemaking.
A. The Need for Public Process
Public process in judicial rulemaking seems necessary for several reasons.
Most fundamentally, it is compelled by democracy and is consistent with our
customary mechanisms of lawmaking.1 78 There recently has been an
increasing awareness that when courts make rules, they are performing a
legislative rather than an adjudicative function and should, therefore, instill
elements of public process similar to those employed by other legislative and
quasi-legislative bodies.179
Judicial rulemaking not only addresses "strictly technical questions of
procedure," but because it is a legislative proceeding, judicial rulemaking also
has "a substantive effect on sensitive issues of social policy."180 Frequently
mentioned examples of such sensitive issues include class actions,'18
privileges, 8 2 and attorney advertising.M  However, because sensitive issues
are governed by court rule in many states, these issues often do not enjoy
public process elements 84 similar to those elements which operate when the
legislature considers socially significant acts. 8 5
177 In large part, this lack of examination into public process for state court rulemaking may be
due to the concentration of inquiries on federal court rulemaking. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1;
Flanders, In Praise of Local Rules, 62 JUDICATURE 28 (1978); Lesnick, supra note 175. Federal court
rulemaking is far less encompassing of diverse subject areas than is state court rulemaking.
Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072, 2075-2076 (1976) with AMEICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, USES OF
THE JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING PowEa (1974) (research project).
178 Professor Lesnick finds that the current federal rulemaking structure fails to meet "the
expectations of our constitutional traditions." Lesnick, supra note 175, at 582.
1'79 Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351,371,307 A.2d 571,578 (1973) (Weintraub, C.J.); id. at 381-82,
307 A.2d at 584 (Conford, J., dissenting); id. at 393,307 A.2d at 589 (Mountain, J., dissenting); C.
GBAu, supra note 175, at 49; Wheeler, supra note 175, at 285. Judge Weinstein notes: "When courts
assume a legislative role, they should also assume the restraints that accompany that role. Public
deliberations are a basic safeguard to insure a legislative process that is fair and informed." J.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 87.
Professor Hazard finds that the United States Supreme Court "in some respects is certainly a
legislative body." Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 COaR.ELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1978).
Professor Hazard finds, however, that the Court's rulemaking process is "quite undemocratic" yet
"capable of producing a very satisfactory product." Hazard, Book Review, Undemocratic
Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1294 (1978) (book review of J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1). In large
part this finding seems to be based on the view that "the public, and indeed most of the bar, has
very little that is worth saying with regard to the Rules." Id. at 1291. However, the reader should
consider whether "increased legitimacy in the rulemaking process derives from public
participation per se regardless of whether public contributions are likely to be politically viable."
Parness, supra note 66, at 1324 n.32 .
i80 Wright, supra note 1, at 656.
"s' See, e.g., id. at 654; Wheeler, supra note 175, at 284.
182 See, e.g., Lesnick, supra note 175, at 580; Wright, supra note 1, at 654; Note, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 1177, 1190-91 (1978).
M82 See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 175, at 522; Parness, supra note 66, at 1322 n.27.
IP4 This fact is true even when the courts employ advisory committees. See, e.g., Hellman,
supra note 175, at 522 (describing as "highly secretive" the work of the Oklahoma high court and
a special bar association committee on the advertising rule); Lesnick, supra note 175, at 580.
18 In the Ohio General Assembly, for example, rules have been adopted which govern both
House and Senate committee meetings and committee procedures. Such rules provide for prior
notice, opportunity to be heard, and record-keeping. See, e.g., rules 31-39 of the Ohio House of
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There are also sound practical reasons for increasing public access to
rulemaking procedures. The final product is likely to be better if different
viewpoints are considered. Just as legislative committees receive testimony
from interested and knowledgeable persons on bills under consideration,
courts too could benefit from the expertise and perspectives of others.'
Possible effects of proposed action may be brought to the court's attention
which otherwise might go unforeseen, permitting correction of deficiencies in
proposed rules at an early stage. Even where public process does not lead to a
different result it is a valuable tool in promoting public acceptance of judicial
action. The knowledge that there exists an opportunity to be heard helps
make the action more acceptable. Conversely, a wise rule may be criticized if
it is promulgated with no opportunity for public input." 7
B. The Achievement of Public Process
Several characteristics of a public process rulemaking mechanism can be
identified. These characteristics include a known rulemaking mechanism
which provides sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, attempts to
insure a reasoned basis for decision, and remains open to public initiative.
Perhaps the most basic characteristic of public process in judicial
rulemaking is that the rulemaking mechanism be known to the public.
8
Opportunity for participation will be meaningless if the public is unaware of
Representatives, reprinted in HousE Jout.AL 53-54 (January 10, 1979). See also Omo LEGISLATIVE
SERV. COaMus'N, A GumEBOOK FOR Ouso LEGIsLATORs 50-,55 (1977).
Benefits of public participation are also being recognized in the area of administrative
rulemaking. A bill currently pending in Congress provides that "to ensure a full and balanced
discussion of the desirability of proposed agency action and its alternatives, each agency should
maximize the opportunity for timely and meaningful public comment in the decisionmaking
process." Reform of Federal Regulation Act of 1979, S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (3) (1979).
1'6 This statement assumes, of course, that others will have sufficient interest to convey their
views, an assumption that we make though it may not be shared by others. Hazard, supra note
179, at 1291; Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 114, at 348 n.2; Wright, supra note 1, at 654.
I7 Public process in judicial rulemaking can be implemented in a manner which
accommodates valid reasons against having such public process. Thus, emergencies which call
for rule promulgation without the usual public process may be recognized, and costs and any
inconvenience can be minimized by tailoring the public process to the type of rule being
considered.
188 This component is noted by most commentaries on public process in judicial rulemaking.
See, e.g., C. GRAu, supra note 175, at 52, paraphrasing J. WEINs'rmIN, supra note 1; Lesnick, supra
note 175, at 580; Wheeler, supra note 175, at 285. In a description of the United States Judicial
Conference, the duties of which include the study and presentation of suggested changes in
federal rules, Professor Lesnick said:
Nor has the conference itself seen fit to publish procedural rules or even an informal
statement describing its procedures. What we know about the method by which rules
are drafted and considered comes largely from speeches or articles by judges active in
the work of the Judicial Conference. Were the Conference to state and publish its
procedures, it not only would enhance the awareness of interested persons and thereby
facilitate their participation, it would also find itself required to face explicitly the
question whether its procedures now provide adequate means for obtaining a broad
range of input.
Lesnick, supra note 175, at 285.
Notwithstanding agreement on the desirability of publicizing rulemaking mechanisms, one
recent study found only five states presently have at least some published judicial rulemaking
procedures. C. GaAu, supra note 175, at 57-58. Mechanisms for administrative agency
rulemaking, on the other hand, seem more concretely established. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553,554
(1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (A) (Page Supp. 1978). Yet, even these latter mechanisms
may be affected by the calls for increased public process in governmental decision-making.
Federal Regulation Act of 1979, S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (3) (1979); see Exec. Order No.
12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
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the rulemaking mechanism. Public awareness can best be achieved by the
establishment of a definite rulemaking mechanism for each of the types of
rules,'89 or perhaps for each of the forms of rulemaking authority. 190 Such an
establishment could be accomplished most easily by court rule.
Recently, a few state high courts have promulgated rules on their
rulemaking mechanisms;' 9' in other states, explicit rulemaking mechanisms
have been set out in statutes.192 Typically, these mechanisms provide for
ongoing review of rules by permanent bodies19 consisting of representatives
from the bench and bar'94 and sometimes non-lawyer members of the
public. 9 5 In at least one state, one set of court rules was intended to provide
the mechanism for the adoption of all possible court rules. 196 In other states the
relevant court rule, or statute, provides only a mechanism for adopting
particular types of rules, 19 and such a court rule, or statute, has been
implemented even when final judicial rules are subject to further legislative
review. 198
189 "Certainly, some rules merit less public participation than others.... [N]arrow,
technical rules obviously have less claim to formal public deliberation than rules affecting
,sensitive issues of social policy.' " Parness, supra note 66, at 1322.
190 Some state courts have unfettered rulemaking authority. Other state courts possess
rulemaking authority subject to legislative veto as well as rulemaking authority which is
concurrent with legislative rulemaking authority. Id. at 1323. "Arguably, a broad legislative role
in rulemaking diminishes the need for judicial creation of other modes of public participation,
particularly when state legislatures provide a reliable forum for open debate." Id.
191 See, e.g., North Dakota's rule governing its own rulemaking, the Rule on Procedural
Rules, Administrative Rules, and Administrative Orders (adopted March 15, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as N.D. Sup. CT. R.]; North Dakota's rule governing local rulemaking, the Role on Local
Court Procedural Rules and Administrative Rules (adopted March 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
N.D. LOCAL CT. R.]; Nevada's rule on adoption of administrative rules, the Rules on the Admini-
strative Docket (adopted June 7, 1978) (amended June 16, 1978) [hereinafter cited as NEv. R. AD.
DocKEr]. See also Michigan's rules on high court and local rulemaking, MICH. GEN. CT. R. 926,
933. But see Proposed Michigan Rules, PROPOSED MICHIGAN COURT RuLES SPECIAL PAMPHLET
(West 1978), wherein rule 933 is omitted; Letter from Donald Ubell, Chief Commissioner, Mich-
igan Supreme Court, to Jeffrey A. Parness (July 11, 1978) (on file with authors) (suggesting the
omission was unintentional).
192 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 1.730-.750 (1977) (creating a Council on Court Procedures,
granting it procedural rulemaking power, and generally describing its operation). See also Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-61 to 9-3-73 (Supp. 1979) (granting the supreme court procedural rulemaking
power, but creating an advisory committee to assist the court in its rulemaking responsibilities).
19 In Oregon the reviewing body is the Council on Court Procedures, Oa. REv. STAT. §§
1.730-.750 (1977), while in Mississippi it is the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Practice and
Procedure. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-61 to 9-3-73 (1979). To assist the North Dakota Supreme
Court, there are at least four standing advisory committees: Joint Procedure, Attorney Standards,
Judiciary Standards, and Court Services Administration. N.D. Sup. Or. R. § 8.1. See also MD. R.P.
4(b) (creating a standing committee on procedural rules); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 933 (contemplating
commentary on proposed rules by appropriate committees or sections of both the state bar and
the judicial conference).
"I' See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-65 (Supp. 1979).
195 See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 1.730(1)(f) (1977) ("one public member, chosen by the Supreme
Court"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-34 (West 1976) ("members of the public").
196 N.D. SUP. CT. R. § 2 (making the mechanism applicable to "procedural rules," including
those on pleading and on regulation of the practice of law; "administrative rules," including those
on the general operation of the judicial system; and "administrative orders," including those on
the operation of a specific portion of the judicial system). See also Ralph Erickstad, Chief Justice
of the North Dakota Supreme Court, A New Rule-Making Process for North Dakota, speech to
the Judicial Rule-making Workshop, National Judicial College, in Reno, Nevada (May 22, 1978)
(on file with authors).
'97 NEV. R. AD. DocKEr; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-69 (Supp. 1979).
19" Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-71 (Supp. 1979); MD. R. P. 4(b); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18A.
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Any established rulemaking mechanism should provide adequate notice
of judicial rulemaking activities. Should public participation through
commentary on proposed rules or rule changes be contemplated, 9  notice
should be given well enough in advance to allow for effective response and
should provide actual notice to those most likely to be interested in the rules
under consideration. At times, it may be appropriate to provide not only
general notice to the public at large, but also individualized notice to
particular groups or persons. Depending on whom the notice is intended to
reach, various means of notification may be called for.200 Such notice, in order
to be adequate, should contain enough information so that interested persons
will be able to make informed judgments as to whether to present their
views. 201
States having established rulemaking mechanisms provide for varying
times of notice. Typically, notice is required at least two weeks prior to the
rulemaker's formal consideration of proposed rule changes. 20 2 Furthermore,
they provide that recipients of notice are to include members of the bar,203 the
state bar association, °20 the legislature, 20 5 and the press.2 8 Finally, states
199 Some manner of participation, be it oral or written, should be standard. Yet, "emergencies
may on occasion require the immediate promulgation of a rule without any public process."
Parness, supra note 66, at 1322.
200 United States Representative Holtzman recently made the following proposals which
concern publication of contemplated federal rule changes: 1) that they be published in the
Federal Register; 2) that they be submitted to private publishers of regularly issued materials
published for the legal community; and 3) that they be furnished to organizations representing
those segments of the legal community which are concerned with matters which may be affected
by the changes, as well as to appropriate Congressional committees. H.R. 480,481,96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 61 (1979).
For administrative agency rulemaking, in addition to the notice in the Federal Register, it has
been suggested that agencies consider: factual press releases written in lay language, public
service announcements on radio and television, direct mailings and advertisements where the
affected public is located, and express invitations to groups which are likely to be interested in
representing otherwise unrepresented interests and views. Recommendations of the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-.76(E) (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Recommendations].
201 United States Representative Holtzman suggests that notice of proposed federal rule
changes include "a list of issues that the proposal raises and any copy of the proposal." H.R. 480,
481, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 61 (1979). Advisory Committee Notes now usually
accompany all notices.
Ohio law requires an administrative agency to give a reasonable public notice within at least
30 days prior to the hearing date, which is required to be set out in the notice; the notice must
contain a synopsis of the proposal under consideration and a statement of its intended purpose.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(A) (Page 1978).
202 Oregon law requires notice "at least two weeks before" consideration. On. REV. STAT.
9 1.730(3) (b) (1977). New Jersey law contemplates at least a nine month wait before the effective-
ness of certain rules and requires public notice and opportunity for change in the interim. N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-33 to 2A:84A-37 (West 1976) (relating to evidence rules). Maryland prac-
tice and procedure rules have a 30 day notice period, MD. R.P. 4(b), as do those of North Dakota,
N.D. SuP. CT. R. 7.1. Similar Michigan rules have a "reasonable notice" requirement. MICH.
GEN. CT. R. 933. This notice period is sometimes 30 days and sometimes 60 days. 58 MIcH. ST.
B.J. 285-86 (1979).
20n In Michigan, proposed rules by a local court must be sent "to members of the bar in its
judicial circuit." MICH. GEN. CT. R. 927.1(c). See also On. REv. STAT. § 1.730 (3)(b) (1977).
204 Notice of proposed changes in the General Court Rules of the Michigan Supreme Court
must be sent to "the secretary of the State Bar of Michigan." MICH. GEN. CT. R. 933. See also N.D.
Sup. CT. R. 7.1. In Michigan proposed changes are regularly published in the Michigan State Bar
Journal (official publication of the unified or integrated bar), if not in newspapers of general
circulation or legal newspapers. Letter from Sheldon L. Hochman, Assistant Executive Director
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provide for varying forms of notice, including notice of the proposed rules
changes,20 7 notice of rules for which change is under consideration, 20 8 or
occasionally more extensive information.2 9
Any established judicial rulemaking mechanism should provide for an
opportunity for public input prior to a rule change. Who should be heard
should vary according to the potential impact of the rule; at times it would
seem best to allow comment by the public at large while at other times it
seems desirable to allow only lawyers, judges, or other select groups to
participate. l0 Opportunity for the public to be heard may take various forms:
it may be limited to a hearing through written submissions or may include the
right to be heard orally as well.21" Further, opportunity for the public to give
oral or written response to the presentations of others, or even to question the
rulemaker itself, might be appropriate.212
As with notice requirements, states having established rulemaking
mechanisms contemplate varying types of commentary on proposed rule
changes. Such differences are evident from the variations in the expected
recipients of the hearing notices.213 Similarly, these states provide for differing
For Program, State Bar of Michigan, to Jeffrey A. Parness (August 14, 1978) (on file with the
authors).
205 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-35 (West 1976).
206 N.D. Sup. CT. R. 7.1.
207 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-35 (West 1976); MicH. GEN. CT. R. 927.1(c), 933.
208 OR. REV. STAT. § 1.730(3)(b) (1977) (requiring "description of the substance of the agenda
of the hearing or meeting").
209 Such information includes possible "grounds for" the proposed change and "supporting
documentation." N.D. Sup. CT. R. 3, 4, 7. By restricting examples of public notice and other
characteristics of public process rulemaking to instances where the rulemaking mechanism is
known, i.e., has been established pursuant to statute or court rule, the authors do not mean to
imply that the other characteristics are necessarily missing from any rulemaking mechanism
which is not established or known. Rather, sufficient diverse examples of the other characteristics
can be drawn from the known mechanisms. In regard to unknown rulemaking mechanisms, one
study has found nine states, including Ohio, which possess all crucial elements of public process
judicial rulemaking except for "published rulemaking procedures." C. GRAu, supra note 175, at
57. The authors believe that their disagreement regarding Ohio has been clearly, if not forcefully,
shown.
210 Parness, supra note 66, quoted at notes 189, 190 supra. In administrative agency rule-
making, such standards as "interested persons," 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976), and "any person
affected by the proposed action," OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(c) (Page Supp. 1978), are used;
a standard of persons "whose interests or views are relevant and not otherwise represented ...
whether or not they have a direct economic or personal interest," has recently been suggested.
Recommendations, supra note 200, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6(A) (1979). At least one agency can now
actually promote the utilization of the opportunity to be heard by providing, under certain cir-
cumstances, "for reasonable attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of partici-
pating in a rulemaking proceeding.' 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4)(A) (1976).
211 Ohio agency procedure includes both forms. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(c) (Page
Supp. 1978). The opportunity to present oral testimony, in addition to written comments, has
recently been expanded for several federal agencies. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1976) (Federal
Trade Commission); id. § 2058(a) (2) (Consumer Products Safety Commission); id. § 78f(e) (4) (A)
(Securities and Exchange Commission); id. § 2605(c) (Environmental Protection Agency).
212 Ohio agency procedure allows for certain public examinations. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 119.03(c) (Page Supp. 1978). While the value of cross-examinations in an adversary context is
well known, cross-examination can be quite time consuming. Therefore, recent statutes have
permitted cross-examination in agency rulemaking but have also allowed agencies broad
discretion to strictly limit it. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(4) (A) (ii) (1976) (Securities and Exchange
Commission); id. § 2605(c)(3)(B)(ii) (Environmental Protection Agency).
213 See notes 206-09 supra and accompanying text.
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types of commentary, including written and orai submissions as well as
responses to the commentary of others.2 14
Any established judicial rulemaking mechanism should require a reasoned
basis for decision. The rulemaker should make known the reasons for its
decisions in order to facilitate public comprehension and later implementa-
tion of the rules. 215 In this manner more thoroughly considered rules are
promoted.2 16 In addition, it might be appropriate in certain circumstances for
the rulemaker to be required to respond to the comments and testimony
which have been submitted. The rulemaker should also keep records of its
rulemaking proceedings.2 17 The rulemaker should be free to reject all
commentary but should be required to give reasons for so doing.
Presently, few established state rulemaking mechanisms require either a
statement of reasons for action taken or the maintenance of a record on the
pre-action proceedings. In North Dakota, however, the supreme court may
adopt a rule change2 18 only "after the hearing, completion of the record or
filing of any briefs or comments, whichever is latest."2 19 Allowance is made for
a statement of reasons, but such a statement is optional.
2 2 0
Finally, established judicial rulemaking mechanisms should provide not
merely for responses to proposals initiated by the rulemaker but should
provide a means by which anyone may petition for, or suggest, new rule
changes. Allowing people to bring existing deficiencies to the attention of the
rulemaker would make the rulemaking mechanism more democratic and
more responsive to problems.
A few state rulemaking mechanisms now expressly permit petitions for
rule changes. 21 They establish time periods within which the petitions must
214 For example, pursuant to a rule which mandates that there be "manner and means by
which the comments may be made," MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 933, one court typically requests that
comments thereon be sent to the court's clerk. 58 MicH. ST. B.J. 195 (1979). In a second state, the
rulemaker is compelled to hold a "public hearing" in each of the congressional districts at least
once every two years. On. REv. STAT. § 1.740(2) (1977). Finally, the high court in a third state can
only promulgate rules which regulate the practice of law after the rules receive a majority vote in
an election in which a majority of the registered members of the state bar participate. See TEX.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 4(a) (Vernon 1973), which was recently amended in other
respects. The New State Bar Act, 42 TEx. B.J. 602, 603 (1979).
215 See, e.g., J. WEINSTmN, supra note 1, at 152; H.R. 480,481, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG.
REC. 61 (1979). Legislation is now pending which would require a statement of reasons for all
"major rules" of federal agencies. Reform of Federal Regulation Act, S. 262,96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 601-03. At least one federal agency must now issue "a statement of basis and purpose" as well as
an "explanation of the reasons for any major changes" along with promulgated rules. Clean Air
Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(A) (Supp. I 1977).
216 See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a) ("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . .").
217 See authorities cited in note 215 supra. Although a transcript is not required for informal
rulemaking under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976), at least one
recent enactment requires that a transcript be made of any oral presentations before an agency.
42 U.S.C. § 7191(c)(3) (1976) (Department of Energy). The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act
requires that the transcript be prepared at agency expense. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (C)
(Page Supp. 1978).
218 Exception is made when the court determines an emergency exists. N.D. SuP. CT. R. 6.1.
219 N.D. SuP. CT. R. 9.1. Local courts are under similar restrictions. N.D. LOCAL CT. R. 9.1.
220 N.D. Sup. CT. R. 9.3 ("The action . . . may be accompanied by Official Comment,
including a concise statement of its basis and purpose."). Local courts have a similar option. N.D.
LocAL CT. R. 9.3.
221 See, e.g., NEv. R. AD. Doc=ET § 3.2 ("Any judge, the Director of the Administrative Office of
the Courts, or the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada may file with the Clerk a petition
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be acted upon;22 2 yet, they do not mandate that the rulemakers must
implement elements such as notice and opportunity for comment when the
petitions are patently frivolous.
22
C. Public Process in Ohio Supreme Court Rulemaking
While Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking is regrettably inaccessible, minor
changes would infuse it with the appropriate amount of public process. The
high court's rulemaking mechanisms include elements of each of the
aforedescribed traits of public process. Perhaps the most important con-
clusion in regard to these present mechanisms is that, where public access is
advisable, if not compelled by our democratic principles, these mechanisms
lack consistency in their allowance of public access.
It is clear that Ohio's judicial rulemaking mechanisms remain relatively
unknown to the public.224 Knowledge of rulemaking mechanisms could, and
should, be increased by the Ohio Supreme Court's promulgation of a set of
rules, 225 or sets of rules, 221 on judicial rulemaking.22 7 At least some mechanisms
could be established through other means, such as legislative action.2 8
However, one set of rules would be sufficient, as long as this set of rules would
carefully distinguish between the various sources of the supreme court's
rulemaking authority, the varying social impacts caused by differing rules,
and the traditional role, if any, assumed by the legislature, the executive
branch, the bar, and the general public. Such a set of rules would be similar to
North Dakota's recent promulgation of its rule on rulemaking.22 9 North
Dakota's rule creates four standing committees;2 0 Ohio's use of significantly
more than four different advisory committees since 1968, together with its
larger court system and more populated legal profession, seems to call for a
to adopt amend or repeal an administrative rule."). See also N.D. SUP. CT. R. 3.1,4.1 (allowing
"any person interested in a procedural rule, administrative rule or administrative order" to either
file a petition or request a Standing Committee study).
22 E.g., NEV. R. AD. DocKEr § 4,5; N.D. SoP. CT. R. 3.3.
223 E.g., NEV. R. AD. DocKET § 4.3(a); N.D. Sop. CT. R. 3.5.
12 These rulemaking mechanisms remain relatively unknown even to the authors. not-
withstanding an exhausting, if not exhaustive, search.
225 See, e.g., N.D. SUP. CT. R. § 2, where only one set of rules seems to cover all areas of the
court's rulemaking authority.
226 In Oregon there is one set of provisions dealing with the mechanism for the adoption of
civil rules of pleading, practice and procedure. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 1.730-.750 (1977). There is a
second, distinct set which deals with the mechanism for the adoption of rules for the conduct of
cases involving traffic offenses, boating offenses, and game and commercial fishing law violations.
Id. §§ 1.510-.520. These two mechanisms provide for two different rulemakers, the Council on
Court Procedures and the Oregon Supreme Court.
227 The idea of increased formalization of the mechanisms used in Ohio Supreme Court
rulemaking is not new. It has been said that Judge John V. Corrigan, Chairman of the Rules
Advisory Committee which helped develop the present Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 Omno
B. 727 (1970), suggested in 1970 that there be a permanent, standing rules advisory committee of
the Ohio Supreme Court; however, the court has continued to handle rules projects on an ad hoc
basis. See Letter from Stanley E. Harper, supra note 78.
221 See authorities cited in note 8 supra. Even if possible, establishment of such mechanisms
by legislative action or by constitutional amendment would be unwise. See In re Sunshine Law,
400 Mich. 660, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977); Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 93 Nev. 614,572
P.2d 521 (1977) (each invalidating legislation opening judicial meetings on proposed rules to the
public).
22' N.D. Sup. CT. R.
230 N.D. Sup. CT. R. § 8.1.
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greater number of standing committees. At a minimum there should be
standing committees on rules of civil procedure, criminal procedure,
appellate procedure, evidence, government of the bar, and
superintendence.2' The assignment of North Dakota's committees is "to
provide continuing study and review of present rules and .orders and to
propose the adoption of new rules and the amendment or repeal of existing
rules and orders for consideration by the Supreme Court."2 Within such an
assignment, there should be compulsory, periodic review of all rules as well as
the responsibility of initially reviewing all correspondence which concerns
suggested rule changes.2 3
The composition of any permanent standing committees which are
established to assist the supreme court in exercising its rulemaking authorities
should be defined by court rule. Such definitions should include individuals
whose appointment to the committee is automatic,2 34 individuals whose
appointment is made because they belong to a group required to be
represented on the committee,2 35 and individuals whose appointment is
totally discretionary.2 36 However, totally discretionary appointments should
be minimized. Either the full court, or the chief justice after consultation with
the court, 237 should possess the appointment power. Together with the tra-
ditional assortment of judges and lawyers, many, if not all, of the advisory
committees should have non-lawyer members. It often is possible that a
lawyer's self-interest238 is in conflict with the public interest. 23 Therefore, it is
most important that members from outside the legal profession serve on
committees with jurisdiction over those rules which affect sensitive issues of
social policy.240 Should public membership on certain committees be deemed
231 This is not to imply, however, that there should necessarily be only six sets of actual rules
promulgated by the high court, as compared to the present ten, exclusive of the evidence rules.
See the rules cited at notes 76, 77 supra. Further, standing committees are needed even in areas
where rules are subject to some legislative review. However, the composition of the committees
may need to be varied accordingly. It is inappropriate to assume that potential legislative review
will always result in actual legislative review and thus in extra-judicial public process. Parness,
supra note 66, at 1323 n.31.
32 N.D. Sup. CT. R. § 8.1.
233 Such a responsibility is now held, for the Ohio traffic rules, by the Traffic Review
Commission. Note 140 supra and accompanying text.
2 This automatic appointment would be similar to the way in which supreme court rule now
places the superintendent of the State Highway Patrol on the Review Commission of the Ohio
Traffic Rules. Osno TRAmc R. 22(B).
35 Such appointments would be similar to the way in which the supreme court rule now
places at least one common pleas judge on the Review Commission of the Ohio Traffic Rules. Id.
23 By rule, the Review Commission of the Ohio Traffic Rules has between five and eleven
members, but the origin of only five members is particularized. Id.
237 The chief justice is probably best suited to finally decide on certain appointments to the
committee on superintendence rules because he or she carries the constitutional duty to exercise
"general superintending power over all courts in the state" in accordance with court rules, as well
as the duty to assign temporarily judges of courts of common pleas and appeals. Ooo CONsT. artIV, §§ 5(A)(1), 5(A)(3).
2 For example, consider rules on the unauthorized practice of law, attorney advertising, and
attorney discipline.
239 "As long as the regulators are indistinguishable from those they regulate, it is impossible to
tell when the public interest stops and the self-interest starts." Sims, After Lawyer Advertising,
What?, 50 OKLA. B.J. 1367, 1371 (1979).
240 See notes 181-86 supra and accompanying text.
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inadvisable, as when committee work addresses "strictly technical questions
of procedure," 4 ' other forms of general public participation should be
permitted, if not encouraged. Also, legislative and executive branch
representation on certain committees seems compelled, at least where the
committee functions in areas exclusively within the province of the court and
thus not subject to legislative overview. 242
The lack of consistency in the Ohio Supreme Court's utilization of its
rulemaking authorities may appear most often in its handling of notice on its
rulemaking activities. 243 The inadequate time for public response to the rules
causes difficulties. To alleviate these difficulties and to establish expectations
within those persons who regularly partake of the opportunity to participate
in the rulemaking mechanisms, any high court rule on rulemaking should
include specified times, which must follow notice and precede final
committee and court consideration of rule changes. Emergency rulemaking
should be excepted from this requirement. Further, such a rule should set out
the contents of notice and the recipients thereof. Where available, committee
notes should be published. Also, while publication in the Ohio State Bar
Association Report should not be discontinued, the report should not continue
to be the only official source of notice of many contemplated rule changes.
Ohio's various lower courts, legal and non-legal newspapers and magazines,
local bar associations, relevant legislative committees, law school libraries,
and major non-law libraries should regularly receive notices of proposed rule
changes. 244
Notice of contemplated rules changes should contain information on the
ways in which one's views on such changes could be heard by the body
contemplating change. At the least these opportunities to be heard should
vary according to the type of rule under consideration,2 45 the type of change
under consideration,246 the stage which the rulemaking body has reached in its
contemplation of change,2 47 and the prospects of careful subsequent
legislative review. Yet while the need for flexibility is apparent, the court rule
on rulemaking should attempt to insure that opportunity to be heard cannot
be easily eliminated for invalid or insufficient reasons. This objective could be
241 See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
242 Because subsequent inter-branch problems might be reduced, representation on
committees which work with rules to be submitted to the legislature after court adoption also
seems in order.
243 See notes 13041 supra and accompanying text.
244 Consideration might also be given to the establishment of further, individual mailing lists
by each of the committees.
245 The reader should recall that Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking covers quite diverse subject
areas. Thus, a rule which seeks solely to assist the Administrative Director in his or her
recordkeeping duties might prompt only a call for written comments. However, a rule which
seeks to eliminate alleged abuses in the use of pretrial procedures, including discovery, might
prompt the calling for a public hearing. Oral testimony and perhaps cross-examination would be
received at this hearing because such a rule would need to be based, in part, on factual findings
regarding the nature and extent of any abuses. See, e.g., Lundquist & Schechter, The New
Relevancy: An End to Trial by Ordeal, 64 A.B.A.J. 59 (1978) on recent consideration of such a
possible change in the federal rules.
246 For example, grammatical and other insignificant changes, the purpose of which is not to
affect the substance of any rule, should spur only a call for written comments.
247 The more preliminary the investigation, the more likely it would be that extensive oral
hearings are unnecessary.
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achieved by allowing opportunity to submit written comments, again
excepting emergencies.
Reasoned bases of rule decisions can best be achieved in Ohio by the
requirement that official comments, akin to the existing Staff Notes, 248
regularly accompany major rule changes249 and by the requirement that
records always be kept by the various advisory committees as well as by the
court. It seems foolish to require an extended, official comment on each and
every rule change; yet, perhaps notice on contemplated rules changes should
be required to contain a general explanation of the rationale behind the
changes under consideration 50
Finally, accessibility to each of the Ohio rulemaking mechanisms,
however different they may be from each other, would be greatly enhanced
by a standing invitation to anyone interested to address the relevant
committee. Written comments which concern either the merits or deficiencies
in any of the existing court rules should be accepted. Such invitations have
apparently been extended in the past, but widespread knowledge thereof has
been lacking. Future gaps are easily remedied by inclusion of the invitations in
the rules on rulemaking. Initial review should be vested in a designated
committee member, who should have the authority to eliminate frivolous
communiqu6s from future consideration. Such a reviewer's power need not
be feared since the records of action always would be subject to review.
Further, channels of communication between the various committees should
be established so that, inter alia, misdirected communiqu6s are eventually
considered. Incidentally, such channels need also be open so that each
committee is aware of the work, experiences, and future agenda of the others.
Clear channels of communication can be assured by assigning at least one
person, probably some member of the high court's staff, to sit on each of the
advisory committees.
V. CONCLUSION
By approving the Modem Courts Amendment in 1968, the voters in Ohio
decided to vest in the Ohio Supreme Court new, and greatly expanded,
rulemaking powers. Since that time, the high court has exercised these new as
well as its pre-existing powers by adopting, proposing, or amending eleven
different sets of rules. The high court has generally, and deservedly, received
high commendation for doing so. However, in promulgating rules, the court
has utilized quite diverse mechanisms which often exclude the public at large
from participation in the judicial rulemaking process.
The relative absence of public process from the Ohio Supreme Court's
rulemaking mechanisms is regrettable. This absence should be eliminated
through the court's promulgation of a set of rules on the exercise of its
rulemaking powers. The rulemaking mechanism should be sufficiently
definite to command public awareness. Provisions for public notice and input
I8 See, e.g., note 148 supra and accompanying text on staff notes accompanying the traffic
rules. See also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. Civil Rules at iii-iv, xi (Page 1971) (Editors Preface) for an
explanation of the staff notes to Ohio's rules of civil procedure.
249 See, e.g., N.D. Sup. CT. R. 9.3.
210 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(A) (Page 1978).
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should be formalized so that the public will in fact receive proposals with
adequate time to submit comments. The preserving of public proposals and
official comments will enhance understanding by the rulemaker as well as by
the public. The establishment of standing committees will increase the
opportunity for public input and open channels of communication.
The supreme court should consider these methods for increasing public
participation in rulemaking. These proposals, although simple, conform to
basic democratic principles and will result in more effective, practical rules.
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